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A ‘Power’ Deficit? A Discussion of the Limitations of the ‘Legal Empowerment 
of the Poor’ Approach to Development 
Unlike traditional approaches that integrate law and development, the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor approach claims to focus more upon ‘power’ than law, 
and as a result, is a paradigm with ground - breaking potential. 
The Legal Empowerment of the Poor approach (‘LEP approach’) is heralded as a 
‘new conceptual and operational tool for poverty eradi   ion’1 that typifies a broader 
and more inclusive understanding of poverty than traditional approaches to law and 
development. What differentiates this approach from the dominant law and 
development approaches2 is its recognition that for the majority of the world’s poor, 
laws exist on paper rather than in practice and that central to this problem is not the 
need for economic growth or law reform, but the powerlessness of the poor. 
Accordingly, the approach aims to strengthen the power and            of the poor, 
so they may exercise greater control over their lives. 
This thesis will argue that although the LEP approach offers much  otential for 
empowerment of poor and marginalized people it fails to engage with or incorporate 
a framework for the concepts of power or empowerment. This results in a lack of 
conceptual clarity, which renders the approach open to a variety of interpretations 
and operational outcomes. One outcome is a neglect of formal institutions and 
organizations that are typically the focus of traditional approaches to development. 
This thesis argues that neglecting such institutions both hampers the process of 
empowerment and risks ignoring the structural systems that are responsible for 
people becoming and remaining poor. 
1 Dan B anik ‘Legal Empo werment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty Eradication’ (2009) Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law Vol 1: 117–131 at 117.
2 I refer to  law and de velopment as the relationship between two concepts as opposed to  the movement known as ‘law and 
development’.











This thesis proposes a model that incorporates an understanding of how 
empowerment works. It further develops this model by proposing a power 
framework to operate alongside this empowerment model, to enable a more 
comprehensive understanding of how different types of power operate.
Chapter one gives an overview of how scholars and actors within global institutions 
have interpreted development from post war history to modern day. Altho    this 
history is nuanced, development has been largely influenced by dominant economic 
theories and has been understood as economic growth. The chapter shows how the 
narrow model of development has been challenged as the limitations of markets have 
been recognised, and as it has become evident that a set of economic prescripts do 
not work for all countries in the same way. The chapter describes how attitudes to the 
role of law in development have changed over time, and demonstrates the way in 
which these attitudes have influenced development interventions. Attitudes range
from the post-war understanding of law as subordinate to and instrumental in 
fulfilling the requirements of the state, to the dominant rule of law approach with its 
emphasis on private law, the role of the markets and economic growth.3 This chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that despite having historically being framed in a variety    
ways, law has in fact functioned as a tool to achieve the objectives of economic 
growth. The chapter argues that despite the incorporation of social concerns, such as 
poverty alleviation, gender equity and human rights, the current, dominant approach 
to rights is still controlled by economists, development experts and politicians and 
the rationale behind it continues to be economic growth.  The chapter ends by 
introducing the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) paradigm and argues that 
LEP address the limitations of the dominant approach.
3 David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law”, Political Choices and Development Common Sense’ The New Law and Economic 
Development, A Critical Appraisal (2006) at 102 .
Chapter One: Understanding ‘Development’ and the Role of Law in 
Development











Chapter Two: The Potential and Limitations of the Legal Empowerment 
Approach
Chapter Three:  The Relationship between Power and Empowerment
Chapter two builds upon this discussion and argues that the LEP approach has a 
broader and more inclusive understanding of poverty than the dominant rule of law 
approach, namely poverty as a lack of control over one’s life. The LEP approach 
aligns itself with Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘freedom,’4 whereby ‘empowerment’ is 
seen as both ‘a process and a goal’5 towards poverty alleviation. The
involved aims to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives, and the 
is the achievement of that control.  It is this notion of control that equates to 
increased power for disadvantaged populations. As a consequence, and as Stephen 
Golub, one of the pioneers of the LEP concept argues, the key concept of the LEP 
approach is not law but power. The second half of Chapter two argues that the LEP
approach has a number of failings. First, despite claims that the approach is more 
about power than law, the approach neglects to examine the concept of power and 
empowerment respectively. Second, the LEP approach fails to incorporate a 
framework for either power or empowerment, thereby ren       the approach 
vulnerable to a number of operational outcomes.
Chapter three begins with an acknowledgement that the concepts of power and 
empowerment are fluid and complicated. The first section of this chapter builds upon 
this discussion, by analyzing in greater depth, both c    pts of power and 
empowerment and how they relate to one another. The discussion aims to 
demonstrate why the LEP paradigm would benefit from incorporating a conceptual 
framework to understand and analyse power and empowerment. The second section 
of the chapter discusses the Holland and Brook empowerment model (the 
‘Empowerment Model’), which suggests that empowerment comprises the interplay 
of ‘agency’ and ‘opportunity structure’ as a framework for empowerment. Agency is 
about having the power to make meaningful choices about one’s life, and the 
consciousness of this action. According to the Empowerment Model, a person’s 
4 Am artya Sen, De velopment as Freedom  (2000) at 3 .
5 Stephen Golub ‘Beyond rule of law orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative’ (2003) Working Paper Rule of Law 
Series No 41 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  at 26.
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goal











agency is determined by their ‘asset base,’ which consists of a range of assets 
including human assets (for example levels of education), psychological assets (such 
as the capacity to envisage change) or material assets (such as levels of income). 
Opportunity structure is defined as the context (constituted by formal and informal 
institutions) within which actors operate, that has the potential to assist or constrain 
their ability to transform agency into effective action. Formal institutions refer to 
those institutions comprised of formal rules such as Constitutions, firms, laws, 
regulations or contracts. Informal institutions refer    those institutions comprised of 
informal rules, for example, sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of 
conduct. However, this chapter also argues that the Holland and Brooks model 
should be developed further to analyse how and why empowerment comprises the 
interplay of agency and opportunity structure. The chapter introduces John Gaventa’s 
theory of power, which has been employed by development scholars to understand 
how different levels, forms and spaces of power operate. The section proceeds to 
apply Gaventa’s power typology to the Empowerment Model, to more fully 
understand the types of power involved at both agency   d opportunity structure 
components of the Empowerment Model. Finally, the chapter argues that use of the 
Empowerment Model and Power Framework enables a more comprehensive 
understanding of the power relations at work in a local, national and global context 
and therefore aids a more effective and targeted implementation of LEP strategies to 
aid the poor.
Chapter Four introduces South Africa’s Treatment and Action Campaign (‘TAC’) as 
an example of a campaign which recognized from the outset that empowerment 
depends upon a complex interaction of levels, forms and spaces of power, and its 
success was due in part to the recognition of this fact. The TAC was launched in 
South Africa in 1998 in response to the actions of international pharmaceuticals that 
aimed to prevent the passing of the Medicines Act of 1  7. The Medicines Act 
allowed for the production and importation of cheaper anti-retrovirals, which would 
facilitate access to cheaper anti-retroviral medicines to millions of South Africans 
affected by the virus. However, the pharmaceuticals argued that the Act infringed 












their intellectual property rights and would result in a loss of revenue     them. The 
TAC challenged the actions of the pharmaceuticals and campaigned for the passing 
of the Act in order to improve the affordability and access of quality health care to 
millions of South Africans affected by the HIV virus.
The first part of chapter four provides an overview of the TAC campaign from 1999 
to 2003,6 and sets out the challenges the campaign faced during this period. The 
second part of the chapter acknowledges the internal and external obstacles and 
barriers limiting access to ARV treatment inherent within individuals, organizations 
and formal and informal institutions. Using the Holland and Brook Empowerment 
Model and Gaventa’s Power Framework as lenses, the second section argues that the 
TAC’s founders recognized that overcoming barriers to           would depend 
upon a combination of strengthening the individual agency of    se affected by 
HIV/AIDS and harnessing the support and strength of organizations and institutions 
that comprised the opportunity structure. In this respect, the chapter demonstrates 
how the campaign leaders’ awareness and use of power allowed the campaign to use 
the ‘rules of the game’ to its best advantage. 
The thesis concludes by asserting that although Golub’s formulation of the LEP 
approach has significant potential to facilitate empowerment, the approach is limited 
in a number of ways and as a result, fails to achieve     full potential. The LEP 
approach’s failure to engage critically with, or incorporate an understanding of 
power or empowerment, results in the approach lacking conceptual clarity. A lack of 
conceptual clarity or framework for power or empowerment has a number of 
implications for the approach, not least the tendency  or LEP interventions placing 
too much emphasis on individual agency or institutions respectively. The conclusion 
asserts that Golub’s formulation of the LEP approach places too much emphasis on 
individual agency and neglects the formal institutions and organizations that the 
ROL approach supports. As a result, the LEP approach fails to address the structural 
6 Whilst the TAC continues its activities to  the present day, due to  the time frame examined in this chapter, the past tense will be 
used to  describe TAC’s activities.
Chapter 5 - Conclusion: The LEP Approach – Limitations posed by a failure to 
engage with, or incorporate a framework for, power or empowerment. 











systems that are responsible for people becoming and remaining poor. The thesis 
concludes by arguing that LEP approach must incorporate a framework for power 
and empowerment in order to depart from the limitations of the ROL approach and 
fulfil the approach’s significant potential to facilitate empowerment.
The way in which ‘development’ is understood is influenced by social, political and 
economic factors and differing development narratives    luence the way in which 
underdevelopment is defined, measured and addressed. Similarly, different 
development discourses frame what counts as knowledge, whose voices have the 
most influence in political and institutional contexts and which issues remain 
unaddressed. To understand contemporary mainstream development discourse calls 
for a historical perspective, one that situates it in   lation to antecedent narratives. 
Therefore the first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the various 
ways in which mainstream development has been understood. It seeks to show how 
the narrow model of development as economic growth has been challenged, as the 
limitations of markets have been recognised and as it     become evident that a set 
of economic prescripts do not work for all countries in the same way. The chapter 
traces how conceptions of development have expanded from a post-war focus on 
industrialisation to a current broader understanding that places greater focus on 
social concerns such as poverty alleviation, gender equity and human rights. 
The chapter also describes the changing relationship between law and development. 
Attitudes towards the role of law in development range from, post-war attitudes to 
law being subordinate to and instrumental in fulfilling the requirements of the state,7
to the present belief that the rule of law is synonymous with development,8 a 
development objective in itself, rather than a vehicle through which to achieve 
development. The dominant expression of this contemporary theory that is geared 
7 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 102.
8 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 167.
Chapter One – Understanding ‘Development’ and the Role of Law in 
Development
1. Introduction – Understanding ‘Development’











towards bringing about the rule of law, and one which this chapter explores, is 
defined as the Rule of Law approach.9 The chapter shows that development policy 
has been dominated by neo-classical economic theory,10 the broad objective of which 
is the liberalisation of markets for global capital.11 This theory presents poverty as 
something that can be objectively and scientifically measured and means that 
development is framed in terms that are presented as technical and apolitical. 
Similarly, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that despite the fact that the current Rule 
of Law approach to development purports to empower the poor and marginalised by 
making justice accessible to them, in practice, the approach has a neo-liberal agenda 
of economic growth and its strategy of strengthening formal institutions often 
reinforces the inequitable status quo. The rationale behind this institutional focus, 
namely courts and a functioning judiciary, is that the rule of law is essential for long-
term development because it provides security for foreign and domestic investment 
and international trade, by protecting property, intel      l property and enforcing 
contract rights, thereby advancing economic growth.12 As a result, economic 
outcomes are a direct goal of the approach, in contrast to the goal of poverty 
alleviation, which is indirect.  
The second section of this chapter argues that the Rule of Law approach’s focus on 
formal institutions neglects the fact that the poor an  marginalised, for a host of 
financial, psychological, and geographical reasons are unable to access such 
institutions.13 Thus, the chapter argues that irrespective of what it          to 
achieve, the dominant Rule of Law approach serves as a medium through which the 
objectives of the neoliberal approach to development is furthered.
This chapter concludes by introducing the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (‘LEP’) 
paradigm as a new approach to law and development, formed as a reaction to the 
limitations of the dominant Rule of Law approach. The     approach purports to 
9 Alvaro Santos The World Bank’s uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development (2006) Georgetown Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-053 at 253.
10 The neo-liberal approach is the name given to  the policy outcomes of the neo-classical economic theory, which is dominated 
by Chicago economists.
11 Joseph E. Stiglitz ‘Capital Market Liberalization, Globalization and the IMF’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol 20,no 1 
(2004) at 1 , accessed at http://www.relooney.info/00_New_951.pdf on 15 November 2012.
12 Stephen Golub, (see note 5) 5.
13 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 15.











have the poor as its central focus, and understands poverty, in the broad sense, to 
mean a lack of control over one’s life. This chapter shows that development 
narratives have often marginalised poverty alleviation and prioritised other concepts 
of development, such as modernisation or economic efficiency. However, in order to 
provide context to the LEP approach’s understanding of and focus upon poverty, the 
chapter pays particular attention to how the various development discourses have 
framed poverty.
The following section provides an overview of how post-war attitudes towards 
development prioritised ‘modernisation’ over poverty reduction as a policy outcome, 
and how the role of law was instrumental in furthering this outcome. 
Prior to the Second World War, mainstream development           was dominated 
by economists and focused upon the state, macro-phenomena,14 and the
accumulation of capital and economic growth. Social aspects of development15were 
considered secondary to the goal of economic growth.16
The immediate post war period linked poverty to the notion of ‘underdevelopment.’ 
Newly independent ‘southern’ countries were conceptualised as being at the 
beginning of a linear path towards the more ‘modern’ societies of the North. Brock et 
al17 write that:
‘In this post-war model of development, poverty is an effect rather      a cause of 
underdevelopment and is not therefore the direct focus of policy.’18 Instead, policy 
outcomes prioritised modernisation19over poverty reduction.
14 Hans-Otto Sano, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development, 
Human Rights Quarterly (2000) 734-752 at 739.
15 Such as the environment and po verty alleviation..
16 Hans Otto Sano (see note 14) at 739.
17 Brock, Cornwall, Gaventa, Institute of Development Studies, Working paper 143, P                             spaces in the 
faming of poverty policy, Oct 2001 at 11.
18 ibid
2 The Post-war period 
2.1 Post war attitudes towards Development 











In this context of modernisation, emphasis was placed on         and technology, 
with the concomitant presumption that scientific knowledge is objective and free of 
value judgements. Within this narrative, poverty was defined as a material 
phenomenon, which was based on the positivist assumption that poverty is 
measureable and could be quantified by monetary indicators.20
The way in which poverty is framed has a direct influence on the ways in which 
poverty reduction policies are shaped. So, during this post-war period, interventions 
focused on industrialisation, productivity gains and capital accumulation, which 
would promote growth and, as a corollary, alleviate poverty. Furthermore, by 
presenting poverty as something scientific, measurable, and apparently objective, it 
meant that development policy was framed in terms that were technical and 
politically neutral.21
In the post-war era, law served a mainly instrumental role in furthering 
developmental objectives and ‘development policy focused on the role of the state in 
managing the economy and transforming traditional societies.’22 In practice, the 
implementation of economic theories of modernisation required an expansive legal 
regime. Industrialization required the establishment of many public law institutions, 
which in turn required legislation and policy with which to establish and administer 
the various eleme ts of the system (eg controlling borders, implementing tariffs and 
collecting taxes).23  Emphasis was placed upon the value of public law, (which, at 
this time played a far more prominent role in society      private law) and its 
potential to translate economic theories and policy objectives into action. Rather than 
setting limits upon society, or expressing commitments to be adhered to, law was 
understood as being subordinate to the objectives of society, which were ostensibly 
concerned with economic development. This was reflected in the language of 
19  The term modernisation in this period focussed on the     truction of infrastructure such as universities and hospital-
effectively industrialising the economy/or ‘repeating     transformations that had occurred in the north during the industrial 
revolution’ Kennedy (see note 3) at 98.
20 Brock, Cornwall, Gaventa, (see note 17) at 10.
21 Brock, Cornwall, Gaventa (see note 17) at 10.
22  David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, ‘Introduction, The Third moment in Law and De velopment Theory and the emergence 
of a new critical practice’ (2006), The New Law and Economic Development pp 1-18 at 2 .
23 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 102.
2.2 Law and Development in the Post-War Period











development policy, which David Kennedy asserts was ‘made by politicians and 
development experts, in the vocabulary of economics.’24
The following section describes how 1970s attitudes towards development were 
formed in reaction to the economic objectives of 1960s development aims. 
In the 1970s however, the belief that poverty existed    a result of economic 
disparity began to be challenged.25 This was partly a response to the increasing 
realisation that the growth that stemmed from the previous post-war development 
model had not translated into redistribution of the benefits of growth to the poor. A 
political vocabulary came to replace one of economics, which changed thinking as to 
what development meant and how it should be achieved.26 As a result, discussions 
regarding development focused far less than before on  modernization’ and 
‘industrialization’ and more on multi-disciplinary and more micro-oriented27
indicators which reflected an improvement in quality of life.28
As a result, poverty began to be described in terms of other physical and material 
factors, such as ‘education,’ ‘literacy,’ ‘infant mortality rates,’29 ‘nutrition,’ ‘low 
health standards’ and ‘adequate shelter.’30 The World Bank’s agenda of ‘basic needs’ 
under Robert McNamara’s presidency (1968 to 1981) put social goals and women’s 
concerns on the agenda and epitomized this change in thinking.31 This emerging
trend placed poverty alleviation at the forefront of the Bank’s mission and led to an 
emphasis in funding of urban infrastructure and services in both the health and 
education sectors. Indeed, these new development indicators were the focus of direct 
and targeted government programs, both nationally and internationally and they 
allowed progress to be measured and global comparisons to be made.32 Concomitant 
with this development in World Bank thinking was an emphasis on an integrated 
24 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 105.
25 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 112.
26 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 111.
27 Hans Otto Sano (see note 14 ) at 739.
28 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 112.
29 Ibid.
30 Misturelli Federica and Heffernan Claire What is Poverty? A diachronic exploration of the discourse on poverty from the 
1970s to  the 2000s. The European Journal of Development Research Vol 20 No.4 December 2008 666-684 at 671.
31 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 113.
32 Ibid.
3. The 1970s.  
3.1 Attitudes towards Development in the 1970s











approach to development, arising from the popularization of political science’s world 
systems theory. This ‘highly structural and systematic exercise’33 regarded all facets 
in the system of development as vital for the roles they play both individually and 
collectively. The systems perspective envisaged a pivotal role for the state, as well as 
social infrastructure. Together with dependency theory, the systems perspective 
reinforced the idea that development would require significant changes to the global 
political and economic system 34and simultaneously framed the poor as part of the 
development system rather than simply a problem that needed to be solved. 
However, the greater global forces that were at work in this era, such as the 1973 oil 
crisis, rising interest rates, and floating exchange rates35 meant that the evolving 
economic context of this era was that of rapidly slowing economic growth and the 
provision of ‘cheap’ development loans primarily by first world private banks to 
third world governments to finance basic needs. These       ‘facilitated 
unprecedented and unsustainable levels of national indebtedness across the 
developing world.’36 Fiscal policy replaced development policy and national 
governments gradually lost their margin to negotiate with foreign private banks, 
monetary authorities and to the IMF.  Meanwhile, a new development vision was 
taking shape that refuted the economic ideas of the post-war period and the political 
ideas of the 1970s. These ideas found their proponents in institutions such as the IMF 
and the private banks of the north.37
The shift in thinking from economic theory to more political ideas regarding 
development, also meant that to an extent, in the 1970s ‘legal ideas became more 
significant to development policy expertise than economic theories.’38 As with its 
forerunners in the post-war period, law was an instrument of social purpose, its 
function largely to perform an instrumental role in implementing an economic, but 
now also political development agenda.39 Public law remained salient, its role being 
to empower the state, which (unlike private markets wh    were assumed to be too 
33 Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (see note 17) at 11.
34 Ibid.
35 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 117.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid
38 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 111.
39 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 117.
3.2       Law and Development in the 1970s 











weak to ensure growth) played a commanding role in the economy.40 However, 
during this decade, the legal ideas of development experts began to change.41 One 
important development was a newfound appreciation for the significance of formal 
rights.42
The influence of the ‘law and development’ movement (which originated in the 
United States in the 1960s) was one reason behind a change in attitudes. Law came 
to be understood less as an instrument to express social needs as dictated by 
economic theory, and more as a medium that ‘expresses competing social needs and 
purposes, which the jurist, no less than the administrator or political leader, must 
weigh and balance.’43 As a result, law became regarded as an instrument for 
balancing and selecting among diverse claims.
Against this backdrop, a new legal order began to emerge. This new order placed 
emphasis on legal education in developing societies, the assertion of rights and self -
determination of the peoples of newly independent states, and international legal 
obligations.44 The international human rights movement was borne in this period, 
and as a result, the humanitarian objectives of development policy began to be 
articulated as social and economic rights45 and a call arose for development itself to 
be transformed into a right. This focus on rights was      panied by a turn to the 
judiciary to enforce these rights, as opposed to the action of states or international 
institutions.46
The following section however describes how the 1980s represented a reversal of 
much of the 1970’s thinking and how the decade was dominated by neoliberal 
policies and characterized by structural adjustment policies.  
40 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (see note 22) at 29. 
41 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 120.
42 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 120.
43 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 121.
44 David M. Trubek ‘The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New Developmental State’ (2008) Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law, Vol 1, No 1 at 6 .
45 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 123.
46 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 123.
4. The 1980s











4.1 Attitudes towards Development in the 1980s
The 1980s was characterised by a ‘neoclassical contra     lution’47 and a reversal of 
much of the previous decade’s thinking where development was concerned. 
Widespread disillusion with the outcomes of state-led development resulted in 
economic growth being reinstated as the most effective means for poverty 
alleviation, and a move away from interest in social sectors and micro-orientation.48
This neoliberal understanding of economic development     a limited role for the 
state in the economy and a view that the private sector would deliver economic 
growth, only if free from state regulation. As a result, the idea of a free market (an 
economy controlled by supply and demand without state intervention) prevailed.
The focus on poverty reduction of the 1970s was cast aside and the structural 
adjustment policies (‘SAPs’) of the IMF and World Bank came to dominate the 
decade. These policies were presented as matters of necessity to stabilise failing 
economies and restore economic growth, and were in fact closely aligned with 
political conditionality. This conditionality was imposed on Southern country 
governments and resulted in the decreased autonomy of such governments and the 
increased power of donors and lending institutions to  hape policies. SAPs included 
the removing of excessive government controls such as        taxes, cutting public 
expenditure on health and education and eliminating all industry subsidies, including 
those to agriculture.49 The narrative of development as economic growth assume  
that such austere measures would result in economic growth and the benefits of 
which would ‘trickle down’ to the poor. However, in reality, these measures resulted 
in exacerbated levels of poverty due to decreased provision of basic social services, 
rising unemployment, falling wages, increased infant mortality rates, lack of food 
security and declining school enrolment rates.50
47 Hans Otto Sano (see note 14) at 739.
48 Hans Otto Sano (see note 14 ) at 740.
49 The World Health Organization website, Structural Adjustment Programmes accessed on 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html on 1 July 2012.
50 A broad discussion in respect of SAPs  is beyond the scope of this thesis, but for further information, Joseph E. Stiglitz details 
this point in his book ‘Globalization and its Discontents’ (2002).











4.2 Law and Development in the 1980s. 
5 The 1990s 
The emergence of neo-liberal ideas about development as economic growth meant 
that during the 1980s, law functioned as the instrument for neoliberal policy.51  
Unlike the post-war view that the state was best placed to orchestrate the economy, 
neoliberalism posits that the private sector is the engine of economic growth.  The 
state was to play an enabling role, but not interfere    the market. The role assigned
to law was to limit the role of the state and facilitate the development of the private 
sector.52 In neoliberalism’s premise that markets were necessary for economic 
growth, the primary role attributed to legal institutions was that of a foundation for 
market relations.53 Completely new legal regimes were necessary to achieve policies 
of structural adjustment and conditionality, domestically and internationally in order 
to support markets, financial and, intellectual property regimes. New statutes and 
regulations were required to structure the privatization of state     d enterprises, 
establish financial institutions and support new capital markets. As a result, private 
law became more salient than public law and courts played an increasingly 
significant role as they were regarded as central to enforcing market transactions by 
enforcing contracts and upholding property rights,54 and ‘protecting business against 
the intrusions of government.’55  This role of law, specifically the judiciary in 
enforcing such rights was thought to be universal, the attitude being that ‘markets 
were markets and therefore the same legal foundations  ould be needed and could 
operate anywhere.’56 Trubek and Santos summarise the 1980s as a time in which 
‘neoliberal law and development thought focused primarily on the law of the market’ 
and one in which ‘relatively little concern was shown for law as a guarantor of 
political and civil rights or as protector of the weak and disadvantaged.’57
The following section sets out how attitudes to development in the 1990s were 
shaped to a large extent by disillusion with the effects of structural adjustment 
policies.   
51 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2 .
52 David Kennedy (see note 3)at 139.
53 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2.
54 David Kennedy (see note 3)at 139.
55 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2 .
56 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 6 .
57 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2 .











5.1 Attitudes towards Development in the 1990s 
During the early 1990s, growing opposition in the Sout  to structural adjustment 
policies, the Asian and Latin American currency crises, and a widespread feeling of 
vulnerability to globalisation in the North were some    the many reasons which 
fuelled widespread disappointment with the economic, political and social results of 
the neoliberal paradigm. This opposition was reflected in the publications of 
international development agencies, such as UNICEF’s ‘Adjustment with a Human 
Face’58 report, which documents the failures of SAPS as having neglected society’s 
most poor and vulnerable. The real backlash came in 1990 when the UNDP released 
its Human Development Report.59 The focus of the UNDP report in particular 
departed from the economically motivated attitudes of the 1980s to a concern for 
human development and the ability of people to choose their livelihoods.60 The thrust 
behind this report was that development should be people-centred and should lead to 
the empowerment of the poor as opposed to their marginalisation.61 Critiques 
levelled at neoliberal policy makers questioned the exclusive focus on economic 
growth that had previously dominated development thinking and which had not 
necessarily lead to poverty alleviation.62 In addition, critics such as Joseph Stiglitz
questioned the lack of attention paid to existing loca  institutions and the assumption 
that laws and legal institutions which were thought to reflect best practice could be 
transplanted (by top down development interventions) into any context. Critics noted 
that an understanding of local context was paramount t  effective economic policies 
and in practice, disregarding the importance of this had often led to results 
diametrically opposed to those that had been intended.63
Economist Amartya Sen had considerable influence on the reframing of poverty and 
development in this period. The core principle behind     ‘capabilities approach’ is 
58 Note this was published in 1987.
59 UNDP, Human De velopment Report 1990 (1990).
60 UNDP report (see note 59) at 10.
61 Ibid.
62 See here Stiglitz, who was World Bank vice-president. He wrote ‘Globalisation and its discontents’ which critiqued structural 
adjustment.
63 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 6 .











that poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon, at the heart of which is a lack of 
freedom. His book, Development as Freedom64 articulates the idea that all 
individuals are equipped with a set of capabilities which determine what an 
individual is able to do, or is capable of.65 Poverty is a denial of capabilities and 
freedoms to achieve what each individual is capable of and freedoms include for 
example, being well nourished and healthy, having access to information and to be 
able to participate in community life. Development is     process of expanding the 
real freedoms that people have cause to value. Expansion of freedoms is seen as both 
the principal means and the primary end of development.66 In this sense, Sen draws 
parallels between freedoms and rights when expounding     intrinsic and 
instrumental importance of democracy and human rights    achieving developmental 
goals.67
Set against a backdrop in which efforts were made to define development as freedom
and not just economic growth, and focus was placed on poverty reduction and 
concern with local context,68 attitudes to the role of law also began to change. In
addition to creating the infrastructure for markets, law, in the form of human rights 
(which included socio-economic rights) gained ascendancy as a means to social 
needs that markets could not meet.69
The international backlash therefore ensured that the development agenda once more 
took social and environmental considerations into account. Developmental lessons 
learned from the neoliberal era included respecting existing institutions, social 
networks, and peoples’ livelihoods and being cautious of their destruction in the 
name of development.70 In addition, development policy makers placed greater 
emphasis than before upon participation by the poor in poverty alleviation efforts and
ensuring that the goals of development come from the choices and decisions made by 
development actors themselves.71 During this post neo-liberal era, neo-classical 
assumptions had not essentially shifted, but rather had just reformed. The focus of 
64 Am artya Sen, De velopment as Freedom (2000).
65 In addition, Sen also played a major role in developing tools to  measure human de velopment, beginning with the Human 
Development Index (HDI), leading to  the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender –Related Development Index 
(GDI) which covered issues of gender equality. Finally, the Human Poverty Index was de veloped and published in the 1997 
HDI, which aims to  measure poverty in terms of human lives rather than incomes.
66 Am artya Sen (see note 4) at 3 .
67 Bhupinder Chimni ‘The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary International Law Discourse: Some Parallels’ The 
Law and De velopment Review, Vol 1 , Iss.1  (2008) Art, 2  at 12.
68 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2 .
69 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 2 .
70 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 154.
71 Hans Otto Sano (see note 14) at 740.











development policy was provided less by economics and  ore from the concept of 
the ‘nature of the good state,’72 which it was envisaged would define the framework 
and create an enabling environment for human development. There was increasingly 
a more balanced view of the role of the state, which was understood to be neither 
minimalist (as heralded by neoliberals in the 1980s), nor interventionist (as reflected 
by the post-war state model). Rather, the state was viewed as stable, striking the 
balance between public and private and ‘oriented toward maintaining a social 
democratic market, integrated with the world economy.’73 In this period, the meaning 
of development came to correspond with definitions of ‘human rights’     the ‘rule 
of law’ whereby the promotion of human rights became synonymous with the 
promotion of development itself.74
It is important to note however, that despite this incorporation of attention to 
peoples’ livelihoods, and human rights into the meaning of development, the 
neoliberal agenda of the previous decade continued to prevail, albeit now with a 
softer face. 
In the 1990s, the rule of law came to be seen as an end in itself, a development 
objective, rather than a means to achieve development. What the ‘rule of law’ meant 
varied over time. Attention shifted from legal reforms to support market institutions 
such as a stock exchange, a system of banking and corp      law, to an increasing 
importance placed upon elections, courts, judicial review and local human rights 
commissions. Kennedy highlights the increasing importance of law and legal 
institutions in the 1990s when he asserts ‘it now seemed that building the rule of law 
- the whole rule of law, all the institutions and all the rules would be necessary, one 
that...substantively respected human rights and market freedom.’75 Indeed, courts 
were regarded as central to market transactions such as the enforcement of contracts, 
property and other private rights, and a means to resist encroachment by the state.76
72 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 156.
73 ibid.
74 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at 1.
75 Ibid.
76 David Kennedy (see note 3) at 141.
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6 The Contemporary Period
6.1 Contemporary Attitudes towards Development 
.
The following section provides an overview of how contemporary development 
ideas, whilst incorporating a range of social concerns such as rights, gender and 
poverty alleviation, in fact continues to reflect mainstream neoliberal attitudes.  
Development practitioners today do not share the consensus that characterized the 
post-war and neoliberal periods about what constitutes development.77 Policy ideas
that dominate the development field include macroeconomic stability, engagement 
with the international trade system, anti-corruption and transparency as prescriptive 
for government reform, and the pursuit of human rights.78 The increasing emphasis 
given to social concerns within development discourse is reflected in the 
contemporary rhetoric of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF), which states that development theory  ust consider the 
structural, social and human dimensions of development. In practice this translates 
into greater concern for direct poverty alleviation, democracy, access to justice, 
gender equity and human rights.79 Whereas the neoliberal development agenda 
presents itself as technical, apolitical and necessary for economic growth, the 
inclusion of social concerns into development rhetoric and practice has the potential 
to re-politicise development by introducing concepts such as accountability into the 
development framework. One outcome of this potential re-politicisation of 
development is that existing unequal power structures and relationships which 
previously worked to benefit elites could potentially now be challenged. Although 
development discourse has incorporated a of social concerns, a brief 
discussion regarding the incorporation of a human rights narrative into the 
development agenda is a useful illustration of their overall potential.  
The incorporation of human rights into the development agenda is known as a ‘rights 
based approach’ to development. There are numerous interpretations of how human 
77 David Kennedy Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance ( 008) at 49 available at www.topwonks.org/law-
and-de velopment-economics-toward-a-new-alliance, accessed on 24 January 2013.
78 Ibid.
79 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, (see note 22) at  11.
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rights and development relate and what is meant by a ‘human rights based approach 
to development (‘HRBA’). Theoretically, there are divergent views on the way the 
two paradigms frame and work together. DIFD’s report on Human Rights for the 
Poor states that an HRBA states that:
‘…all people...have a right to demand that governments f   il their duties to 
respect, protect and promote civil, cultural, economic, social and political 
rights. Because these obligations are internationally  greed and monitored, 
citizens can use them to hold their governments to account.’80
Cornwall and Musembi extend this notion of accountability by stating that ‘the 
language of a ‘rights-based approach’ in the development context also offers the 
possibilities for an expanded notion of accountability for rights to non-state actors.’81
This assertion is reflected in the Draft Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to 
Poverty Reduction Strategies wherein the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
states that ‘accountability of policy makers and other actors whose actions have an 
impact on the rights of people...is perhaps the most important source of added value 
in the human rights approach.’82 By providing a normative framework of ‘rights’ to 
‘development’ the Human Rights- based approach frames poverty as an issue of 
justice. The ability to demand rights, coupled with the ability to hold states to 
account if one’s rights are not realised means that rights are essentially ‘a priori 
about power relations.’83 It is this political nature of rights which brings ‘power 
relations centre stage in poverty reduction’84 and gives the Human Rights based 
approach the potential to re-politicise development.
However, despite the fact that current dominant economic theory              social 
concerns, such as rights, gender issues and poverty alleviation, it is important to note 
that this dominant theory does not constitute a new development model. Rather, it 
reflects an incorporation of social considerations into the mainstream neoliberal 
80 Department for International Development ‘Realining Human Rights for Poor People’ Strategies for achieving the 
International Development Targets, (2000) Strategies Paper at 10.
81 Andrea Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi ‘Putting the ‘rights-based approach’ to  development into perspective’ (2004)
Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No.8 pp 1415-1437 at 1417.
82 CESR Hum an Rights insights no.1 Draft for comments accessed at http://www.cesr.org/downloads/CESR%20Briefing%20-
%20Human%20Rights%20and%20Poverty%20-%20Draft%20December%202009.pdf in December 2010.
83 Caroline Moser ‘Rights Power and Poverty reduction’ (2004) Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections, World 
Bank Publication (Ruth Alsop (ed)) at 30.
84 Ruth Alsop and Andrew Norton ‘Power, Rights and Poverty Reduction’ (2004) Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and 
Connections, World Bank Publication (Ruth Alsop (ed)) at 8 .











paradigm. Mainstream development attitudes continue to stress the importance of 
markets as the central mechanism for economic growth. Although social concerns 
such as health and education are valuable goals in themselves, arguably the current
approach to development incorporates such considerations because they are 
instrumental in providing a secure framework for economic growth. For example, an 
educated and healthy population is better able to generate and make use of economic 
opportunities. The resulting increase in income allows people to generate more 
employment opportunities and re-invest in society, expanding and contributing to a 
better standard of services and facilities that public enjoy. The underlying 
assumption is that a secure and stable environment better attracts foreign and 
domestic investment, as it is better equipped to safeguard property and contract 
rights. As such, the incorporation of social concerns into neoliberal rhetoric does not 
reflect deep structural changes in policy and practice, and the overarching    rative 
regarding poverty is that economic growth reduces poverty through the trickle down 
effects of economic growth. 
Similarly, the role of law in development continues to codify these neo-liberal 
interests and in effect, operates as a tool in the hand of the neoliberal agenda.  The
alignment of the role of law with a neoliberal agenda is well illustrated by Santos and 
Trubek’s assertion that the ‘development world’s continued faith in markets’ is 
reflected in the ‘World Bank legal projects which still focus primarily on creating the 
conditions of market activity.’ Indeed, the idea that the legal system is essential for 
economic growth now forms part of the conventional wisdom in development 
theory.85  The idea’s most common expression is the ‘Rule of Law’ (‘ROL’): ‘a legal 
order consisting of predictable, enforceable and effic     rules required for a market 
economy to flourish.’86 It is important to differentiate between conceptions of the 
rule of law87 and traditional rule of law development ideas, strategies and practices 
aimed at bringing about the rule of law often as means to achieve good governance, 
85 Santos (see note 9) at 253.
86 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 9 .
87 While defined in various ways, the rule of law prevails where (i) the government itself is bound by the law, (ii) 
every person in society is treated equally under the law, (iii) the human dignity of each individual is recognized and 
protected by law, and (iv) justice is accessible to  all.  (citing World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform: Observations, 
Experiences, and Approach of the Legal Vice Presidency (Washington D.C: World Bank, July 2002) at 1 .
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poverty alleviation and economic growth.’88 For ease of reference, rule of law 
practices, (as distinct from rule of law per se) will        in be referred to as the 
‘ROL approach.’ 
One assumption of the ROL approach is that institutions are fundamental for 
economic growth, and by corollary, for development. The approach understands 
‘institutions’ narrowly to mean institutions as organizations, with a particular focus 
on state institutions.89 As a result, the approach places strong emphasis on th  
strengthening of institutions such as prosecutorial services, judiciaries and the police, 
and more recently new state initiatives, which are designed to empower the private 
sector and ensure competitiveness– such as public private partnerships and new 
forms of social policy.90
The ROL approach’s neoliberal agenda of presenting development interventions as 
technical and with ‘objective scientificity,’91 .is reflected in the World Bank’s
powerful rhetoric, which ‘[justifies] the Bank’s involvement in reforming developing 
countries’ legal and judicial systems [by portraying] this endeavour as an apolitical 
one.’92
Whilst legal language may give the appearance of being logical, analytical and 
apolitical, ROL approach interventions reflect the interests and power of certain 
groups and are therefore always political. As Kennedy states, such legal vocabulary 
‘emphasise(s) some things and leaves others behind.’93 This reasoning is exemplified 
by the ROL approach’s emphasis upon the importance of               in particular 
the judiciary, and its failure to address the fact that in reality, such institutions are 
often inaccessible to the poor. Institutions, in particular access to justice is 
inaccessible to poor people owing to substantive or procedural barriers (such as lack 
of financial means, physical inaccessibility, language issues and low legal literacy, 
88 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
89 This narrow interpretation is to  be contrasted with Douglass North’s  all encompassing definition of ‘institutions’ as ‘ the rules 
of the game in a society, or…  the humanly de vised cons      s that shape human interaction..both formal constraints- such as 
rules that human beings devise-and informal constraints- such as conventions and codes of behaviour’ (Douglass C. North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, U,K: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 110.
90 Trubek (see note 44) at 30 and 31.
91 Andries du Toit ‘Poverty Measurement Blues:Some Reflec  ons on the Space for Understanding ‘chronic’ and ‘structural’ 
poverty in South Africa’(2005) 5  Chronic Poverty and Development Policy at 7.
92 Santos (see note 9) at 256.
Kennedy (see note 3) at 105.











unfamiliarity of court procedures) psychological barri    (a mistrust or fear of the 
law), unequal power relations, lack of procedural information, and the length of time 
it takes to process cases.94 As a result, the majority of poor rely on other formal non-
judicial institutions or informal justice mechanisms to provide quick, inexpensive 
and culturally relevant remedies.95  The ROL approach’s focus upon formal 
institutions, and its neglect of the litany of reasons which make these institutions 
inaccessible to many, detracts attention away from the key structural and relational 
factors which cause poverty, and limits the way in which both development and 
poverty are understood. In addition, the typically top down and contextually blind 
interventions of the ROL approach have been criticised as being a ‘breathtakingly 
mechanistic approach.’96
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (‘LEP’) is a ‘new conceptual and operational tool 
for poverty eradication’97 that has emerged as a reaction to the ‘limitations’98 and 
‘structure blindness’99 of the ROL approach. 
The LEP approach typifies a broader and more inclusive understanding of poverty, 
and offers a new paradigm for integrating law and development.100 Stephen Golub, 
the pioneer of the LEP approach, refers to the ROL approach as being ‘top-down, 
state-centred’ and based on ‘questionable assumptions, unproven impact and 
insufficient attention to the legal needs of the disadvantaged.’101 By contrast, the LEP 
approach recognises that development need not only be   nfined to institutions and 
policies, but should explore the broader cultural, social political and socio-economic 
94 Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice, ‘How informal systems can contribute’  UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (December 2006) 
accessed on 1 May 2012 at 13. 
http://www.democraciaejustica.org/cienciapolitica3/sit  /default/files/doingjusticeewawojkowska130307.pdf 
95 Wojkowska (see note 94) For this reason, Wojkowska states that ‘Informal justice systems are often more accessible to    or 
and disadvantaged people and may have the potential to  provide quick, cheap and culturally relevant remedies. Informal justice 
systems are prevalent throughout the world, especially in d          countries. They are the cornerstone of dispute resolution 
and access to justice for the majority of populations, especially the poor and disadvantaged in many countries, where informal 
justice systems usually resolve between 80 and 90 percent of disputes.’
96 Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law and ‘The Three Integrations’ (2009) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1:21-27 at 24 citing 
Thomas Carothers ‘The Problem of Knowledge’ in idem, P   o ting the Rule of Law Abroad. In  Search of Knowledge, (2006), 
pp. 15-30 at 21.
97 Dan B anik (see note 1) at 117.
98 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
99 Stephen Golub, (see note 5) at 3 .
100 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 3 .
101 Ibid.
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structures within society and their impact on the abil    of the poor to access justice.  
Central to the LEP approach is the understanding that at the heart of poverty lies the 
powerlessness of the poor. In addition the LEP approach recognises that rather than 
provide an accessible vehicle through which to seek and access justice, the formal 
institutions supported by the ROL approach entrench existing unequal power 
relations and limit the opportunities, choices and wel  being of the poor. LEP 
addresses these limitations by focusing on that which the ROL approach neglects, 
that being, without sufficient power to enforce laws that benefit them, legal rights for 
the poor will exist on paper, but not in practice.102 For this reason, although the 
approach understands poverty alleviation as ‘material improvement,’103 its primary 
goal is ‘empowerment’. What LEP seeks to achieve is a               of the power 
and capacities of the poor, so that they may have greater control over their lives. 
In a departure from the economic end goals of ROL approaches, and reminiscent    
Sen’s Capability Approach, empowerment is seen as both a ‘process and a goal’104
towards poverty alleviation. The process involved aims at ‘increasing the 
disadvantaged populations control over their lives and as a goal is their actual 
achievement of that goal.’105 In this respect, LEP claims to be more focused on 
power than law.106 Since previous development models have neglected to incorporate 
a power analysis into programs and strategies, a failure that Thomas Carothers refers 
to as ‘the missing link of power,’107 the LEP claim to focus upon power more than 
law promises an approach with ground- breaking potential.  
Chapter two discusses the LEP approach and how it has been operationalised in more 
detail. It argues that in order to fully realise its potential at both the analytical and 
operational levels, the LEP approach must incorporate   framework with which to 
analyse power. Analytically, this will allow a better understanding of exactly how the 
dominant approach fails to empower, and equally how the LEP  pproach is better 
equipped to do so. Operationally, a power framework will enable a more 
102 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 26.
103 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 26. 
104 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 26.
105 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 27.
106 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
107 Thomas Carothers, Power and Empowerment available at http://www.powercube.net/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/newweave_chapter3.pdf  accessed on 1 July 2010 at 40.











comprehensive understanding of the power relations at      in any given context 
and therefore aid a more effective and targeted implementation of LEP strategies to 
aid the poor. 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (‘LEP’) is a ‘new conceptual and operational tool 
for poverty eradication’108 that has emerged as a reaction to the ‘limitations’109 and 
‘structure blindness’110 of the ROL approach. Central to LEP theory is the 
recognition that at the heart of poverty lies the powerlessness of the poor and that the 
formal institutions typically supported by the ROL approach to development, often 
serve to entrench existing unequal power relations and limit the opportunities, 
choices and well being of the poor. By contrast, the LEP approach states that 
development need not only be confined to institutions     policies, but must explore 
the broader cultural, social political and socio-economic structures within society and 
their impact on the ability of the poor to access justice. As a consequence, the LEP
approach focuses on that which the ROL approach neglects, that without sufficient 
power to enforce laws that benefit them, legal rights for the poor will exist on        
but not in practice.111 For this reason, although the LEP approach understands 
poverty alleviation as ‘material improvement,’112 its primary goal is ‘empowerment’. 
What the LEP approach seeks to achieve is a strengthening of the power and 
capacities of the poor, so that they may have greater         over their lives. In this 
respect, the LEP approach claims to be more focused on power than law.113 Since 
previous development models have neglected to incorporate a power analysis into 
programs and strategies, a failure that Thomas Carothers refers to as ‘the missing 
108 Dan B anik (see note 1) at 117.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 3 .
112 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
113 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
Chapter Two: The Potential and Limitations of the Legal Empowerment 
Approach
7. Legal Empowerment of the Poor – A reaction to the Rule of Law approach











link of power,’114 the LEP claim to focus upon power more than law promises an 
approach with ground- breaking potential.  
Chapter two explores in more detail the LEP approach to development as a new and 
alternative paradigm to the ROL approach to development. The first section of this 
chapter argues that the LEP approach has a broader and more inclusive 
understanding of poverty than the dominant ROL approach to development, its 
primary goal being empowerment and its main focus being power as opposed to 
law.115
Section two argues that despite the fact that the concepts of power and empowerment 
are integral to the approach, the approach neglects to examine or e gage with either 
concept, and fails to incorporate a coherent framework to understand, analyse or 
operationalise strategies in respect of either empowerment or power. This section 
discusses how this failure limits the potential of the LEP approach, which results in 
both a disregard for many ideas that define and distinguish the LEP approach from 
the traditional ROL approach and a lack of clarity as to how the LEP approach is 
operationalised. To exemplify this point, the section           the discordance 
between the way in which the 2008 report of the Commission for the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (‘CLEP’) purports to interpret the LEP approach and the 
way in which it has in fact been implemented. 
Section three discusses the intangible and multifaceted concepts of power and 
empowerment and how they may best be understood for the purposes of the LEP 
approach. Caroline Moser’s gender planning framework is introduced in this section 
to distinguish between internal and external processes of how power operates. 
Moser’s framework is used to exemplify how strengthening individual internal 
processes may result in the expansion of freedom of choice and action to a degree, 
but the way in which power operates externally is required to challenge and affect 
inequitable beliefs and norms embedded within institutions.
114 Thomas Carothers, (see note 107) at 40.
115 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .











Finally, the chapter introduces the Holland and Brook’s Empowerment Model 
comprising the interplay of internal and external processes of power, which it defines 
as ‘agency’ and ‘opportunity structure’ respectively,    a framework to understand 
empowerment. 
The LEP approach typifies a broader and more inclusive understanding of poverty
than the ROL approach, and offers a new paradigm for integrating law and 
development.116 It is premised on the claim that poverty persists partly because the 
poor do not enjoy legal rights or the power to exercise those rights.’117 Stephen 
Golub, the pioneer of the LEP approach asserts that the goal of the LEP approach is 
poverty alleviation,118 and at its core is the concept of ‘empowerment.’119 The LEP 
approach understands empowerment to be a dynamic process, resulting in the 
expansion of freedom of choice and action and the abil    to influence the behaviour 
of other agents and social arrangements.’120 In a departure from the economic end 
goals of the dominant Rule of Law approach,121 and aligning itself with Amartya 
Sen’s concept of ‘freedom,’122 ‘empowerment’ is seen as both ‘a process and a 
goal’123 towards poverty alleviation, whereby the involved aims to increase 
disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives, and the being the 
achievement of that control.  It is this notion of control that equates to increased 
power for disadvantaged populations. 
By contrast to the ROL approach, which understands ‘institutions’ to mean formal, 
state institutions, in particular the judiciary, the LEP approach regards ‘institutions’ 
in a broad sense as,
117 Ibid.
118 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
119 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
120 Arjun Sengupta ‘The Political Economy of Legal Empowerment of the Poor’ (2008) Rights and Legal Empo werment in 
Eradicating Poverty at 32.
121 Note that Golub (see note 5) at 3  uses the term ‘ROL Orthodoxy’ to  define the ROL Approach
122 Am artya Sen, (see note 4) at 3 .
123 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 26.
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‘the rules of the game in a society, or… the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction…both formal constraints - such as rules that human 
beings devise - and informal constraints - such as conventions and codes of 
behaviour.’124
By encompassing informal structures within its definition of institutions, the LEP 
approach distinguishes itself from the restrictive ROL approach to institutions, which  
‘places great faith’125 in the common usage and narrow understanding of the wo d 
‘institutions’ as organizations (ie legislatures, universities, firms, regulatory 
bodies).126 Furthermore, the expansive LEP definition serves to broaden our 
understanding of how in reality the poor use justice systems and interact with the 
law. 
Golub asserts that the narrow ROL approach definition of institutions is built upon 
weak assumptions and a disregard for the real needs of the poor.127 One such 
assumption is the ‘supposed centrality of the judiciary’128 to poverty alleviation, 
which Golub argues ignores many of the other ‘roads to justice’129 for serving the 
poor. Indeed, in practice the ROL approach tends to overlook civil society and its 
efforts are top down and centred around the state, where funding is channelled
through government institutions, with a particular emphasis on the judiciary.130 To 
summarise the assertion of chapter one, it is precisely the unequal power relations, 
lack of trust in the judiciary and ‘lack of proximity    legal institutions, financial 
affordability, language and procedural difficulties,’131 that have rendered the poor 
unable to access the ‘justice’ of the institutions which the ROL approach speaks 
to.132 As a consequence, the judiciary is often the last place through which the 
disadvantaged seek justice,133 and in reality, in the majority of cases, the 
124 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 14.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 5 .
128 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 15.
129 Ibid.
21 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 15.
131 Dan B anik ‘Introduction’ Rights and Legal Empo werment in Eradicating Poverty (2008) at 5 .
132 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 3 .
133 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 15.











disadvantaged seek justice via these other ‘roads,’134 namely the formal, but ‘non-
judicial institutions’135 or the informal justice sector.  
The ROL approach places great faith in the equity of both laws and institutions. It 
assumes that the laws it supports are fair and equitable, and the institutions it 
supports will enforce these laws in a neutral and just manner. Similarly, ROL
approach interventions to strengthen and support such institutions are often justified 
as being apolitical and neutral. 
By contrast, the LEP approach regards laws and institutions as a reflection of 
political, historical, cultural and social processes that shape the formal and informal 
ways in which the poor interact with the law.136 Rather than presenting interventions 
as apolitical, the LEP approach recognises that the ‘rules    the game’ in society are 
often made and manipulated by the most powerful actors within it and are therefore 
inherently political. As a result, LEP interventions seek to identify and provide the 
poor and marginalised with an understanding of how the rules of the game operate 
and the potential to affect them.137
In addition to understanding institutions more broadly, what further distinguishes the 
LEP approach from ROL is the wide range of services it employs to equip people 
with skills and knowledge. Having identified through participatory methods, the 
needs and preferences of the poor, legal empowerment interventions include, 
‘[legal] training, media, public education, advice and other mechanisms; 
litigation, both on an individual basis and through public interest lawsuits, 




137 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 14.
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of non judicial representation’138 through which to enhance people’s legal 
knowledge and skills.
Golub stresses that legal work is often only a part and ‘not necessarily the most 
important part’139 of an integrated strategy that features other development activities 
such as community organising, use of the media, micro-credit provision, and literacy
training or reproductive health services.140 The recognition that law is not necessarily 
the most valuable or useful intervention is another departure from the ROL approach. 
Similarly, although acknowledging the importance of state involvement, the LEP 
approach looks to civil society to carry out such work in the belief that ‘most 
successful and creative legal services for the poor across the globe generally are 
carried out by NGOs or similar such organisations.’141
As set out above, the LEP approach’s broad understanding of what constitutes 
poverty is reflected in its all encompassing approach    poverty alleviation, both in 
its wide interpretation of and engagement with a number of informal and formal 
institutions, and the way in which it seeks to combine with other development related 
disciplines. 
As demonstrated above, the LEP approach is conceptually and operationally 
ambitious, and distinguishes itself from the ROL approach in a number of ways. 
Many of these distinguishing features, such as the approach’s broad definition of 
‘institutions’, and greater focus upon power as opposed to law, provide the LEP 
approach with potential to better understand how the poor interact with the law and 
are therefore better able to assist individuals in the empowerment process. However, 
despite the fact that Golub states that the LEP approach is focused far more on power 
than law,142 the approach fails to engage with the meaning of empowerment or power 
138 Sumaiya Khair,  ‘Evaluating Legal Em powerment: Problem   f Analysis and Measurement’ (2009) Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law Vol 1, Issue 1 pp 33-37 at 33.
139 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 25.
140 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 26.
141 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 28.
142 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
7.2  LEP Approach Limitations - lack of engagement with concepts of power or 
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and as a result, lacks a coherent framework by which to understand, analyse and 
apply each concept to LEP strategies. By failing to engage with,    to incorporate a 
framework for the concepts of power and empowerment, t   success of the LEP 
approach is restricted. Firstly, a failure to engage with the concepts effectively 
undermines the idea of power being at the heart of the approach, and prevents those 
using the LEP approach from analysing in a clear or structured way the power 
relations involved in the various relationships, formal or informal structures or 
interventions in any given development context. As a result, the LEP approach risks 
being as Mona Elisabeth Brother points out, a ‘disengaged model [since]… good 
ideas need a structural approach to be made sustainable.’143 Ultimately and most 
importantly for the LEP approach, these failures hinder the ability to build a coherent 
and sustainable strategy of empowerment.  
Secondly, a lack of conceptual clarity allows LEP theory to be interpreted in a 
number of different ways. This increases the potential for the dilution of or disregard 
for a number of ideas that define and distinguish the LEP approach. For instance,
Golub’s expansive definition of institutions as constituting ‘the rules of the game’ in 
society is a central idea within the approach, which increases our frame of reference 
as to how the poor may interact with the formal and informal rules and processes that
constitute this broad definition of institution. However, although Golub 
acknowledges that the rules of the game are about huma  interactions and therefore 
about power,144 the LEP approach fails to examine the power relations    power 
interests at work behind the rules of the game. As a result, although the frame of 
reference regarding institutions has expanded, the of understanding as to how 
such institutions work and how best to engage with them is limited.  Since the LEP
approach recognises that an ‘understanding of the “rules of the game” count just as 
much as pipes, fertilizers and access to credit,’145 a lack of proper understanding of 
this important concept is a significant limitation for all those involved in designing, 
implementing or benefitting from an LEP intervention. 
143 Mona Elisabeth Brother, ‘Legal Empowerment as a New Concept in Development: Translating Good ideas into Action’
(2009) Banik Dan, Rights and Legal Empo werment in Eradicating Poverty at 49.
144 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
145 Matthew Stephens ‘The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed’ (2009) Hague Journal on 
the Rule of law Vol 1, Iss 1 pp 132-155 at 144.
145 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
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As set out above, a lack of clarity leaves the LEP approach open to broad 
interpretation, and as a result of this, also vulnerable to a number of divergent ways 
in which the LEP approach may be operationalised. LEP theory as described by 
Golub places huge emphasis on individual empowerment, as well as the importance 
of informal institutions, whilst distancing itself from placing too much importance 
upon formal institutions as is common practice with traditional ROL approaches to 
development. However, a lack of clarity within the theory may, upon 
implementation, result in a neglect of the relationship between institutions and 
individuals and too much or too little emphasis placed on               of each 
respectively. 
The fact that LEP is open to broad interpretation and a subsequent imbalance in the 
way in which interventions may be implemented is demonstrated by the divergence 
between the way in which the 2008 report of the Commission for the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (‘CLEP’) purports to interpret the LEP approach and the 
way in which it has in fact been operationalised. 
The CLEP was established in 2005 with the mandate of ‘exploring how nations can 
reduce poverty through reforms that expand access to legal protection and 
opportunities for all.’146  One aim was to re-address the weaknesses of the dominant 
ROL approach and change the focus to ‘examine poverty through the lens of “legal 
exclusion” – that is, exclusion from protection by the rule of law.’147 This section 
will look to the first volume of CLEP’s report of 2008 (‘Report’), which constitutes 
the research findings and subsequent recommendations of the Commission, in order 
to examine how the CLEP has interpreted the LEP approach.148
146 High Le vel Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor at 4 , available at 
http://www.statkart.no/Engelsk/Cadaster_and_Land_Regis    Property_Centre/Legal_Empowerment _of 
_the_Poor/filestone/Eiendomsdivisjonen/PropertyCentre/Vettre/20060609_HighlevelCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePo
or.pdf (Cadastre & Land Registry  Norwegian Mapping and Cadastre Authority). Accessed on 5 June 2011
147Stephen Golub ‘One Big Step Forward and A Few Steps Back for Development Policy and Practice’ (2009) Hague Journal on 
the Rule of law Vol 1, Iss 1, pp 101-116 at 102.
148 The second volume consists of findings of five working groups which, although contributing to  the Commission’s thinking, 
reflect the opinion of the respective working groups rather than those of the Commission.
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Structurally, the Report is based around four ‘pillars’ or ‘empowerment domains.’
The first three are: ‘property rights,’ ‘labour rights’ and ‘business rights,’ and the 
fourth pillar being what Golub refers to as the ‘enabling framework’, namely ‘access 
to justice and the rule of law.’149
Conceptually, the Commission defines legal empowerment to be a process of 
systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, 
through legal systems and legal services to protect and advance their rights and 
interests as citizens.150 The Report aligns itself with Golub’s description of the LEP
approach in a number of ways. Firstly, the Report asserts that   gal empowerment 
should primarily be based on local conditions and should revolve around the needs 
and priorities of the poor. Secondly, it takes informal structures into account and 
claims that the approach should be realistic in its assessment of the relationship 
between formal and informal legal mechanisms.  Finally, the Report notes that legal 
structures may create barriers that hinder development, and their removal may 
encourage economic activity, which the LEP approach recognizes as a contributory 
factor to development. 
However, the report diverges from Golub’s interpretation of the LEP approach by 
presenting a far narrower interpretation of legal empowerment, which emphasises 
legal services yet excludes other development related     vities. The implications of 
this omission are important since it reveals a narrowing of the understanding of 
development as something that can be achieved with legal mechanisms, and by doing 
so thereby making invisible a whole host of other important development 
considerations.  Beyond the semantics of the definition of Legal Empowerment 
however, it is useful to look to the general themes of the report to     how the LEP
approach has been interpreted.  An immediately apparent theme, and one which 
pervades the Report, is that such exclusion deprives people of ‘livelihoods, income 
and assets.’151 Interestingly, the focus on the economic impacts of exclusion aligns 
149 Making the Law Work for Everyone’ Volume I Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (‘CLEP 
REPORT’) at 27 , available at accessed 
on 5 February 2010.
150 CLEP Report (see note 149) at iii.
151 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 112.
                                                  











itself with the notion of material improvement as development, which, (although 
recognised by the LEP approach as a contributory factor to development) is 
advocated as the central means to development by the ROL approach.  
Property rights are assessed to be central to ‘security and livelihood’152 and 
essentially, the Commission advocates the formalisation of land systems (and the 
formalisation of the informal economy in general) in order to ‘extend the protections 
of the law and to unlock billions of dollars of untapped capital.’153 Indeed, the 
market-based slant of the Report is highlighted in the belief that  ‘integrating the 
extralegal economy into the formal economy [will create] a functioning market for 
the exchange of assets.’154
Criticism levelled at this approach warns that such an indiscriminate broad brush 
approach to land titling may prove more harmful than beneficial, since without the 
presence of a range of other social, political and economic factors, it is unlikely that 
the benefits of land titling will be realised.155 Brother156 argues that the introduction 
of individual titles or the formalisation of informal            may not be appropriate 
to ancestral or traditional communal land systems. To   ghlight this point, Brother 
notes that the formalisation of informal lands has often only served to entrench 
power and economic imbalances within informal systems, leading to the 
disempowerment and increased vulnerability of women, pastoralists, small-scale 
farmers and urban and rural tenants.157  
Similar criticism can be applied to the Report’s approach to the regulation of labour 
and business rights which broadly state that the process of making the formal market 
increasingly more ‘inclusive and attractive,’158 will allow disadvantaged workers to 
be legally empowered, by being brought into the ‘framework of effective legal 
regulation.’159 Whilst this proposed solution of regulating business rights and labour 
152 Matthew Stephens  (see note 145) 145.
153 Matthew Stephens (see note 145) at 148.
154 CLEP Report (note 149) at 6 .
155 Jan Michiel Otto ‘Rule of Law Promotion, Land Tenure and Poverty Alleviation: Questioning the Assumptions of Hernando 
de Soto’ (2009) Hague Journal of Law Vol 1 Iss 1 , pp173-194 at 190.
156 Mona Elisabeth Brother, (see note 143) at 51.
157 Mona Elisabeth Brother (see note 143) at 51.
158 CLEP Report (see note 149) at 62.
159 Ibid.











markets makes workers more ‘visible’ from a regulatory perspective, it 
simultaneously renders as invisible the range of polit   l, social and economic 
obstacles that the poor encounter in their struggle for empowerment.160  In this 
respect, the balance of power is tipped, and the process of empowerment is redefined 
and simultaneously reduced to being understood as ‘formalisation’, which by 
corollary narrows the scope of interventions used. 
The Report further lacks an in-depth analysis of gender needs and a much need 
‘gender’ lens though which each pillar could be analysed.  This lack of analysis is 
surprising given that the Report acknowledges that although women constitute half 
of the world’s population and are more likely to work    the informal economy,161
they paradoxically only own a disproportionate ten percent of the property in the 
world.162
Similarly, whilst the Report acknowledges that education, investment in 
infrastructure and other public goods, as well as addressing climate change are 
important to reduce poverty, these assertions remain at the level of rhetoric. The 
primary emphasis of the report is on legal interventions, which is reflective of the 
ROL approach to development.
Although the Report recognises the importance of the informal justice sector, it does 
not fully explore the implications of retaining, supporting or strengthening the 
informal economy, nor how this might better assist the poor. Rather, the Report 
unequivocally assumes formalisation to be the only solution and advocates the 
integration of the informal into the formal justice system. In this sense, the Report 
advocates formalisation without recognising that it is often this formality in itself and 
what it represents which results in the poor seeing law as ‘tools of oppression and not 
empowerment.’163 Thus what is needed is not an ‘extension of formality’ but a 
transformation of the way in which the poor relate with the law. 
160 Julio  Faundez  ‘Em powering Workers in the Informal Economy’ (2009) Hague Journal of LawVol 1,Iss1 pp 156-172 at 158 .
161 CLEP Report (see note 149) at 38.
162 CLEP Report (see note 149) at 6 .
163 Matthew Stephens (see note 145) at 134.











It seems that while the Report proclaims that ‘politics cannot be ignored,’164 the 
Report tends to examine legal considerations in isolation and neglects to consider the 
‘political economy for reform.’165 The Report does recognise that those in power 
may discriminate against or seek bribes from the poor    side with powerful figures 
who may have vested interests in preventing the poor from competing 
economically.166  However, as Stephens argues, the Report fails to engage with 
political challenges such as elites sharing power with the poor.  One explanation for 
failing to address such key issues is Stephens’ suggestion that the Report is in fact 
aimed at such governments and national leaders (ie a top down approach) as opposed 
to being addressed to the poor, whom it purportedly concerns.
To conclude, on a positive note, the Report should be   mmended for raising 
international awareness to the link between ‘poverty,           and legal exclusion’167
and opening up a ‘political space for legal empowerment work.’168  It recognises 
important, often overlooked factors, such as the importance of business rights,169 and 
the crucial role that ordinary members of a community, trained in law, can play.
However, whilst the Report purports to be structured around LEP concepts, and 
acknowledges key factors for consideration in how lega  empowerment can alleviate 
poverty, it often fails to address these factors substantively, or in a way which can be 
easily operationalised. In addition, much of the substance of the Report emphasises 
the importance of formal institutions, formalisation of informal systems, and 
economic growth as means to achieve development. In this respect, the Commission 
aligns itself with attitudes that shape the ROL approach. 
The discordance within the Report could be due to a number of factors, ranging from 
the differing interests and influences of those commissioning the Report, to the fact 
that the lack of a coherent framework leaves the LEP approach open to broad 
164 CLEP Report (see note 149) at 3 .
165 Matthew Stephens (see note145) at 153.
166 Matthew Stephens (see note 145) at 110.
167 Matthew Stephens (see note145) at 133.
168 Ibid.
169 Matthew Stephens (see note 145) at 145, who states that business rights are ‘the right of people to  start a legally recognized 
business without arbitrarily applied regulation or discrimination.’












interpretation and therefore a greater likelihood that it will be operationalised in a 
number of ways.  Whatever the reasons, arguably, if the LEP approach was less 
conceptually vague and had a coherent framework, the likelihood of the approach 
being used as a useful rhetorical tool behind which in practice traditional ROL 
approach objectives are achieved, would be significantly reduced.
Both power and empowerment are complex concepts that are challenging to define
and as a result, incorporating a framework in respect    both into LEP theory,
presents a key conceptual challenge for the approach.
A key conceptual challenge for the LEP framework is what ‘empowerment’ means, 
and how it relates to ‘power’. Both are contested terms that encompass different and 
often conflicting aspirations. Should, as Arjun Sengupta proposes, empowerment be 
understood as a ‘relational concept,’170 in that power is exercised relative to the 
structures of authority and power in place in society?171  Implicit in this view of 
empowerment is the assumption that one side’s gain in power would result in another 
side’s loss. Alternatively, should empowerment be understood in terms of Caroline 
Moser’s more individualistic notion, as an increase in ‘self reliance and internal 
strength?’172  While these constructs of empowerment are not mutually exclusive, for 
conceptual clarity, Kabeer’s173 distinction between external and internal power 
relations, or ‘power’ (being external) and ‘empowerment’ (being internal) is helpful. 
Kabeer argues that ‘people with power may not necessarily be (my 
italics) as they may not have been denied their ability to make choices in life.’174
Similarly, if one can be ‘empowered’ does this necessarily equate to having ‘power’? 
If we understand and organise the concept of ‘power’ as relational ‘vis a vis the 
prevailing structures of power and authority’175 in society but ‘empowerment’ as 
170 Sengupta (see note 120) at 34.
171 Ibid
172 Caroline Moser ‘Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs’ (1989) World 
Development vol 17 No 11. pp 1799-1825 at 1815
Naila Kabeer ‘Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment’ (2002) Discussing Women’s Empowerment: 
Theory and Practice, Sida Studies at 19.
174 Banik, ‘The Political Economy of Legal Empowerment of the Poor’, Rights and Legal Empo werment in Eradicating Poverty 
at 12, citing (Kabeer 2002) .
175 Sengupta (see note 120) at 34 citing Moser (2004) ‘Rights Power and Poverty Reduction’ Power Rights and Poverty: 
Concepts and Connections (Washington DC: DFID and World Bank).
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individualistic, then those using the LEP approach may become empowered by 
learning about their rights and entitlements or the ‘rules of the game.’176 However, if 
pro-poor or democratic legal and political power structures are not in place, for any 
reason, be that lack of funding, lack of political will, corruption, despite being 
‘empowered’ arguably they lack ‘power.’
Caroline Moser’s gender planning framework is a useful tool to distinguish between 
internal and external power relations and how the two  perate in this respect.  The 
framework distinguishes between what Moser terms ‘practical’ needs and ‘structural’ 
needs. Practical needs are those perceived to be immediate and are formulated in 
response to daily conditions. Structural needs may be regarded as those, which 
demand equality in the laws, policies, attitudes and operations of institutions and 
power structures, which comprise the ‘rules of the game.’ 
Drawing parallels between Moser’s gender planning framework and the needs of 
those living in poverty, practical needs are those immediate, daily needs, such as 
food on the table, clean water, clothing and shelter.      immediate needs are best 
accessed by harnessing and strengthening a person’s internal sense of strength to 
participate in, control, negotiate with or influence decisions and actions that affect 
their lives. This increased sense of internal strength and shift in consciousness may 
be achieved for example, by greater access to information, food, clothing or shelter.  
Although the process and achievement of this internal               inevitably 
involves interaction with external power structures such as institutions in the 
broadest sense of the word, (ie community conventions, customs or codes of 
behaviour) these are less likely to include engagement with formal institutions such 
as the judiciary, regulatory bodies or government departments, and are best 
understood to be an internal process of empowerment. 
176 Golub (see note 5) at 14.
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8. A Proposed Empowerment Model and a Power Framework for the LEP 
Approach
Application of the meaning of strategic needs to the context of poverty alleviation, 
equates to the need to challenge prevailing power structures or institutionalised 
inequality. Examples include asserting ones rights to         or food, with the aim 
of changing legislation and influencing judicial decisions.  In recognition of the fact 
that the realisation of strategic needs inevitably operates in tension with such 
institutional structures, Moser states that that their achievement demands 
intellectually a certain ‘level of consciousness,’177 and practically, an element of 
‘struggle.’178 In contrast to immediate needs therefore, structural needs challenge 
embedded power relations and therefore require access    and engagement with 
formal and informal institutions, and the forms, levels and types of power most 
commonly associated with such institutions. Unlike the internal, individual strength 
required to access practical needs therefore, strategic needs demand engagement with 
external power structures.
As further discussed in the following chapter, Holland and Brooks’ Empowerment 
Model demonstrates that empowerment as envisaged by the LEP approach depends 
upon an interplay between internal processes of empowerment and external workings 
of power. However, in order to fully understand the manifold forms of power that
may exist and operate in tension with each other as a result of this interplay, a 
framework to analyse power is also necessary.  Chapter three proposes Gaventa’s 
Power Framework to work in conjunction with Holland and Brooks’ Empowerment 
Model as analytical and operational tools to be used for the LEP approach. 
Analytically, this will allow a better understanding regarding the potential of the LEP 
approach, and operationally, will enable a more comprehensive understanding of the 
power relations at work in any given context thereby aiding a more effective and 
targeted implementation of LEP strategies.
177 Ibid.
178 ibid.











Chapter Three:  The Relationship between Power and Empowerment
9. Understanding Power and Empowerment
The concepts of power and empowerment are intangible by nature, and as a result, 
understanding what each term means and how both concepts interact with one 
another, is fraught with conceptual challenges. Consequently, both terms suffer from 
a lack of clarity and common agreement and unsurprisingly, current uses remain 
contentious. 
Chapter two introduced the complex, fluid and interrelating concepts of power and 
empowerment. The first section of this chapter builds upon this discussion by 
analysing the two concepts and how they relate to each other in greater        This 
discussion demonstrates why the LEP paradigm would benefit from incorporating a 
conceptual framework to understand and analyse power and empowerment.  The 
second section of the chapter discusses the Holland and Brook empowerment model 
(the ‘Empowerment Model’), which suggests that empowerment comprises the 
interplay of ‘agency’ and ‘opportunity structure’ as a framework for empowerment. 
In order to more fully understand the types of power involved at both agency and 
opportunity structure components of the Empowerment Model, the third section of 
this chapter uses Gaventa’s power typology (‘Power Framework’) to understand how 
different levels, forms and spaces of power operate. It argues that this Power 
Framework enables a more comprehensive understanding of the power relations at 
work in a local, national and global context and therefore aids a more effective and 
targeted implementation of LEP strategies to aid the poor.
To conclude, the chapter introduces South Africa’s Treatment and Action Campaign 
as an example of a highly successful legal empowerment initiative, the success of 
which is due in part to its recognition that empowerment depends upon a complex 
interaction of different types of power at the agency and opportunity structure











9.1 An Analysis of Empowerment and Power 
Understanding Empowerment
The term ‘empowerment’ has many different meanings according to the political or 
socio-cultural context within which it is used.179   Empowerment has social, political 
or economic dimensions, and is applicable to both individuals and groups on a local, 
national or global scale.  It was initially most commo    associated with the 
women’s movement,180 but contemporary associations encompass a wide range of 
meanings depending from which social, political or economic school of thought they 
stem.
It is useful to understand empowerment as analogous to Sens’ concept of freedom. 
Sen understands empowerment as improving the quality of people’s lives by 
enabling them greater control over the decisions and resources that affect them.181 In 
this respect, the expansion of freedom and the gaining of control both equate to 
gaining greater power over one’s life. 
Power relations and perceptions of power are normative, in the sense that both 
relations and perceptions are influenced by the context within which we live, our 
experiences of the world and our place within it.  Indeed, when considering how 
power relations affect society’s most marginalised, the assumption that society’s 
marginalised or poor constitute a homogenous ‘other’ m    be discarded.  Rather, it 
is essential to appreciate that the poor are a heterogeneous group, varied according to 
many other factors such as ethnicity, caste, age, gender, family position or class, as 
well as cultural or geographical distances. A range and variety of factors also means 
that individuals or groups may be disempowered in a number of different ways and 
by corollary, the ways in which people are empowered will also vary accordingly. 
On an individual level, a person’s individual needs, perceptions and behaviour are 
often conditioned by historical events and unequal conditions of society.182 This 
historical shaping of needs, perceptions and behaviour serves to highlight how 
179 Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock write that within development terminology ‘empowerment’ [has] gained the most 
expansive semantic range of all, with meanings pouring into development from an enormous diversity of sources, which include 
feminist scholarship, the Christian rights, New Age self-help manuals and business management.’ A Cornwall and K Brock 
‘Beyond Buzzwords “Poverty Reduction”, “Participation” and “Em powerment” in Development Policy’ (2005) 10 United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development Overarching Concerns Programme Paper 1  at 5 .
180 Cecilia Luttrell et al available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4525.pdf, accessed on 4 October 2011.
181 Amartya Sen (see note 4) 36-37.
182 David Mosse ‘Power Relations and Poverty Reduction’ (2004) Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections (Ruth 
Alsop (ed)) 52 at 53. 












empowerment is affected by both internal psychological factors, and external factors, 
both of which influence and shape each other. 
External factors include institutions and organisations. The LEP paradigm uses 
Douglas North’s broad definition of ‘institutions’ as distinct from organisations, as a 
frame of reference. According to North, institutions are systems of established formal 
and informal social rules that structure political, economic and social interactions in 
society.183 Informal rules include sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of 
conduct, for example table manners, how one speaks, dresses, behaves in a business 
environment, or what one expects of others.  These informal rules are what North 
would describe as ‘informal institutions.’184 Once informal institutions are codified 
by a specific set of laws or acknowledged guidelines, they cease to be informal and 
become formal rules or institutions. As a result, formal rules are easier to see and 
understand and include Constitutions, laws, regulations or contracts, and comprise 
what North would define as formal institutions. For example, the South African 
Constitution or South African Labour laws are formal institutions that shape the 
South African political economy, and govern labour practices respectively. As 
discussed in Chapter one, North describes these formal and informal  ‘institutions’ 
collectively as the ‘rules of the game’ in society. 
By contrast, organizations are narrower in scope and both impact upon and are 
influenced by institutions. Organizations may include            such as regulatory 
bodies, universities or unions, all of which have established boundaries, and rules 
and regulations which operate to establish the mandate of the organization, 
distinguish members from non members, and establish chains of command and 
responsibility within the organization. Therefore, whereas the South African 
Constitution exemplifies a formal institution, the Human Rights Commission is an 
organization with a Constitutional mandate to investigate and report on the 
observance of human rights and take steps to secure redress where human rights have 
been violated. Similarly, distinct from the formal institution of South African Labour 
Law is the organisation of The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
183 Gun Eriksson Skoog, ‘Supporting the Development of Institutions – formal and informal rules: An evaluation Theme, Basic 
concepts’ UTV working paper 2005:3, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency at 5 , accessed online at 
http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/pdf/sv/Supporting-the-Development-of-Institutions---Formal-and-Informal-Rules-An-
Evaluation-Theme-Basic-Concepts.pdf on 20 December 2012.
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Arbitration (CCMA), which provides South Africa with a labour dispute resolution 
system. According to North’s definition therefore, ‘organisations’ are a component 
of formal ‘institutions’ and by corollary also comprise ‘the rules of the game’ in 
society.  
Golub asserts that traditional ROL development strategies equate ‘institutions’ with 
‘organisations’, thereby limiting focus to ‘organizations’ such as the judiciary and 
legal institutions such as laws.  By contrast, Golub advocates that in order to fully 
understand how the poor interact with the law, and to assist the poor to affect the 
rules of the game,  ‘the historical, cultural, social     political factors’ that shape 
how the poor interact with both informal and formal institutions must be taken into 
account. 
Crucially, however, Golub fails to incorporate a framework into the LEP approach
by which to understand or analyse the various ways in       the poor interact with 
informal or formal institutions. This chapter proposes the Holland and Brooks 
empowerment model (‘Empowerment Model’) as a framework to enable this 
analysis.  
The Empowerment Model understands empowerment to be de   dent upon the 
interplay of a person’s ‘agency’ and the context in which a person operates 
(‘opportunity structure’). The opportunity structure component of the Empowerment 
Model comprises both informal and formal institutions           to North’s broad 
definition and therefore opportunity structure can also be understood to comprise the 
‘rules of the game’ in society. By locating the ‘interplay’ between individuals and the 
rules of the game as the site for empowerment, the Empowerment Model 
compliments Golub’s assertion that only a thorough understanding of how the poor 
interact with informal and formal institutions will empower the poor to understand 
and affect the rules of the game. 














Agency is about intention, the power to envisage and make meaningful choices, to 
act as one would wish, and the consciousness of this action.185  According to the 
Holland and Brook model, a person’s agency is determined by their ‘asset base’. The 
asset base is similar to Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’     consists of a range of assets, 
ranging from human assets; (such as levels of education, skills and literacy), 
psychological assets; (such as such as self perceived exclusion from     community, 
levels of interaction with people in different social  roups, as well as the capacity to 
envisage change, or have aspirations for change to hap     material assets; (such as 
land ownership) access to information; (such as access to the radio, television or 
newspapers, in addition to proximity to roads, telepho   and post offices) 
organizational capacity; (membership to groups and leadership abilities) and
financial assets (employment history and sources of credit).186  In the same way that 
Sen describes freedoms impacting upon and interacting  ith one another,187 so too 
do assets. For example, the human asset of education,       gives an individual more 
access to information (in itself an asset) as well as the psychological asset of having 
a greater sense of there being alternative options to         All of these assets 
contribute to an individual’s capacity to make meaningful choices.188
Opportunity structure is defined as the context (constituted by formal     informal 
institutions) within which actors operate, that has the potential to assist or constrain 
their ability to transform agency into effective action. As set out above, formal 
institutions refer to those institutions comprised of formal rules such as 
Constitutions, firms, laws, regulations or contracts.          institutions refer to 
those institutions comprised of informal rules, for example, sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct. Alsop and Heinsohn depict the dependency 
of agency on many institutional structures when stating that, 
185 Rosalind Eyben: ‘Linking Power and Poverty Reduction’ (2004) a Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections 
(Ruth Alsop (ed)) at 17.
186 Ibid.
187 Am artya Sen (see note 4) at 37.
188 Ruth Alsop and Nina Heinsohn ‘Measuring Empowerment in Practice: Structuring Analysis and Framing Indicators’ (2005)
3510 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1 at 8 .











‘the presence and operation of the formal and informal laws, regulations, norms 
and customs determine whether individuals and groups have access to assets, 
and whether these people can use the assets to achieve desired outcomes.’189
Viewed through the Empowerment Model, the LEP ‘Court Accompaniment 
Programme’ for unwed mothers in Morocco, provides a useful example of how 
informal and formal institutions comprising opportunity structure affect the abil    of 
unwed mothers to obtain official identity papers in the form of birth certificates and 
family booklets, without which they are unable to access a range of fundamental 
rights or a legal identity.190
Due to the conservative and discriminatory legal, reli ious and social context 
surrounding women’s rights in Morocco,191 unmarried mothers face legal 
discrimination and social stigmatization. The Court Accompaniment Program aims 
to promote the rights of these women, with a two-fold strategy of legal and human 
rights education and a court accompaniment program (together the ‘CAP’). The 
scheme involves the intensive training of hundreds of local NGO members 
(primarily young women) as program facilitators, and implementation of the 
program by partner NGOs, which provide legal and human rights education (with 
themes identified by the recipients of the training),              training, health 
awareness, literacy programs and assistance with income generation projects, to 
thousands of women across Morocco. The legal and human rights programs involve 
group field trips to local public institutions, such as the police station, the court house 
and the civil status office, for question and answer sessions with the relevant 
employees there.192 During these sessions, women learn about the services     e 
institutions offer, the paperwork needed for various applications, and the procedures 
189 Ruth Alsop and Nina Heinsohn (see note 188) at 99.
190 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi ‘Legal Empowerment of unwed Mothers: Experiences of Moroccan NGOs’ 179-
203 at 185  ‘Legal Empo werment Practitioners’ Perspectives’, (Stephen Golub (ed)), International Development Law 
Organisation, Legal and Go vernance Reform, Lessons Learned, No.2/2010. The Family Booklet is the main official document 
proving one’s legal identity and civil status, and is    utmost importance in one’s daily life. It is drafted upon marriage and 
contains all personal information about the Family Booklet’s owner (the husband), his wife/wives, and any children born of the 
marriage(s). Names, places and dates of marriage, eventual divorce, births, and deaths of each family member are recorded and, 
if necessary, modified later. Only one original Family Booklet is issued – in the husband’s name, given to  him, and deemed his 
property. A wife, divorced woman, wido w or legal tutor may request a legalized copy. The Family Booklet is the single most 
essential document in people’s lives – it is on this basis that other official papers attesting to  one’s legal identity and civil status 
necessary to  carrying out most daily acts may be obtained. The Family Booklet is required for, inter alia, obtaining a N ational 
Identity Card, a passport, a driver’s license, free medical care and other social services, legal aid assistance in courts, and a 
vaccination booklet. Also, to  request an official birth, marriage or residence certificate, one needs to present the Family Booklet. 
Without a Family Booklet, people simply do not legally exist. (Extract taken from Bordat and Kouzzi).
191 ibid
192 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 193.











to follow. In addition to familiarizing themselves with forms and procedures, women 
also become familiar with the offices and personnel within these offices. 
Viewed through the Empowerment Model, the CAP reveals     its strategies 
worked upon levels of both Agency and Opportunity Structure components. With 
regards to the Agency component of the CAP, program strategies worked to 
strengthen a range of unmarried mother’s assets; ie the provision of legal, literacy, 
health and other professional training (human assets) and holding group meetings 
between unwed mothers and other women in Moroccan society in order to increase 
unwed mother’s levels of interaction with people of differing social groups, thereby 
reducing unwed mother’s sense of exclusion from the community (increased 
psychological assets). In addition, the CAP’s NGO partners reported that amongst 
themselves, groups of unwed mothers also formed indepe   nt discussion, peer 
education and support groups to share and analyze experiences (organizational 
capacity). 
The Opportunity structure component of the Empowerment Model assists 
identification of the existence of various formal and          institutions in local, 
national and global contexts. 
Formal institutions include criminal and civil laws in Morocco that directly impact 
upon unmarried mothers by acting as barriers to accessing official identity papers for 
their children, and remaining silent where their rights are concerned. Criminal laws 
impose penalties (including imprisonment) for sexual relations outside of marriage, 
which is illegal in Morocco. Rape is regarded as a crime against morality, although 
non- consent is very difficult to prove and victims may be charged with having had 
illicit sexual relations. In addition, abortion is illegal. There are also a number of 
administrative hurdles and other constraints to obtaining a birth certificate or a 
CAP Strategies - Agency
CAP Strategies - Opportunity Structure











Family booklet that involve prohibitive administrative costs, travel expenses193 or 
language barriers.194
Informal institutions include societal attitudes towards the status of women in 
Morocco, which is characterized by inequality, discrimination, economic dependence 
and marginalization. This affects the way women behave, their attitudes towards 
themselves, and how they are treated by family, society and the state.195 Women 
remain under the authority of fathers, brothers or hus   ds. With regards to attitudes 
about female virginity, significant importance is placed upon women being ‘intact’ 
before marriage, and discussion about contraception outside of marriage is taboo. As 
a result, unwed mothers are ‘considered by many as criminals who deserve their 
fate’196 and are often left marginalized with no social networks or financial support. 
Informal institutions in the form of societal attitudes pervade formal institutions. 
Local Moroccan NGOs describe how civil servants take advantage of unwed 
mother’s lack of knowledge of the law and exploit their vulnerability by 
blackmailing them for large sums of money. Similarly, hospital personnel are 
reported to inflict verbal abuse, insults, humiliation and interrogation upon unwed 
mothers, and in rural areas, when hospital staff suspect a mother is unmarried, they 
will inform the police who will question the mother, and, if unmarried, arrest her and 
launch criminal proceedings for illicit sexual relations.197
The CAP employed a number of strategies in order to engage the institutions at the 
opportunity structure component of the Empowerment Model. One such strategy 
included the aforementioned field visits to Civil Status authorities, which aimed to 
build upon the working relationships and contacts between women and NGOs with 
public officials. This strategy provided a forum in which mothers could ask questions 
193 The Civil Status Law requires parent’s birth certificates [in order to  register the birth of a child] This will often involve a trip 
to  the local administration at the person’s place of birth which often involves prohibitive administrative costs and travel 
expenses.
194 Arabic is the official language for administrative purposes, although Tam azight  is more typically spoken with the private  
sphere of the family, a realm occupied by women. As a         women will often speak only the Tamazight dialect, and are 
therefore prevented by a language barrier from accessing the formal justice system.
195  Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 187.
196 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 188.
197 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 189.
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about the administrative procedures involved in the provision of their identity 
documents. Anecdotal evidence from local NGOs reports how, as a result of the field 
visit programme, attitudes of public officials changed and staff became ‘friendly, 
polite, respectful and willing to provide unmarried mothers with information, and try 
to simplify procedures for them.’198
Viewed through an Empowerment Model lens, the CAP example demonstrates how, 
in addition to working with the opportunity structure    ponent of the 
Empowerment Model, CAP strategies also worked to strengthen the agency of 
unmarried mothers. CAP strategies impacted upon both formal and informal 
institutions by working to ease the administrative burdens faced by women, and 
influenced informal institutions by beginning the process of changing attitudes 
towards unmarried mothers. In this respect, CAP strategies assisted in empowering 
unmarried mothers to better understand, engage with, and      the potential to 
transform the rules of the game within Civil Status authorities.
Whilst an Empowerment Model lens may locate the interaction between a person’s 
agency, and informal and formal institutions as the site for empowerment of 
individuals, the model is limited in that it does not        the types of power at work 
at either the level of individuals agency or institutions, or where the two interact. In 
this regard, the Empowerment Model is unable to demonstrate the power of the
poor is strengthened nor how institutional power impacts upon individuals. 
A Power Framework provides a tool for this closer analysis by making vis     the 
various types and forms of power at work be they visible, hidden or invisible, 
thereby providing a more in depth insight into how the rules of the game affect the 
poor, and how LEP strategies may assist in the empowerment of individuals to 
engage with and affect the rules of the game.
The Power Framework developed by John Gaventa, addresses the limitations of the 
Empowerment Model and examines the way in which power  perates at the levels of 
agency, opportunity structure, and where the two interact. 
198 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 195.
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10. Gaventa’s Power Framework
10.1 Levels of Power
Power to
Power with and Power within
Gaventa expands upon Stephen Lukes’199 theory regarding the study of power to 
include additional levels and forms of power and the spaces in which it may operate. 
The following section draws upon the Gaventa Power Framework to examine how it 
may be applied to the Holland and Brooks Empowerment model.
The first component of Gaventa’s power typology describes one form of power as 
‘power to.’ This refers to the capacity to act, exercise choice and shape one’s life 
without domination or necessarily removing power from     her party. The rationale 
behind this type of power is that it is not simply about relocating power, but rather 
about changing the of power relations. Having ‘power to’ results in an 
increased awareness and recognition of what is in one’s best interests and the ability 
for a person to define his/her goals and affect the outcomes that reflect these. This 
understanding of power informs Sen’s capability approach which states that people 
are not free when they do not have the ‘power to’ make choices about their lives.200  
Drawing from the above CAP example, the legal and human rights program sought 
to enhance women’s legal knowledge and skills with the aim of increasing their 
recognize and assert their rights through legal action or the 
challenge policy or regulatory decisions.  
Two further components of Gaventa’s typology are . 
can be understood as collaborative power, the sharing     combining 
of individual power leading to collective action in reaction to powerlessness. It 
concerns finding commonality among differing interests and the building of 
collective strength through organization and development of shared values.  
Steven Lukes, author of (1976)
Amartya Sen (see note 4) at 87-90.
nature 
‘power to’ ‘power to’
‘power with’ and ‘power within’
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In a practical context, ‘power with’ may involve power with individuals, or engaging 
the expertise, resources or support of formal or informal institutions. In the CAP 
example, due to their marginalized roles in society, unmarried mothers lack the 
social connections and traditional family support networks which offer a form of 
‘power with’ to assist them to navigate the complicated bureaucratic procedures to 
obtaining a Family Booklet. The NGOs of the CAP programme recognize that there 
is this void and fill in this role as intermediaries between unmarried mothers and 
local authorities, until women are able to perform this role independently of the 
NGOs. 
Second, visits by unmarried mothers to public administrations resulted in their 
building relationships with the personnel of these institutions and the demystifying of 
processes involved. These field visits resulted in increased solidarity between 
marginalized unwed mothers and administrative officers.  NGOs          that 
officials began to make procedures easier for women in addition to providing them 
with procedural shortcuts. in this regard can help build bridges across 
differing interests, thus reducing or transforming social conflict, and building more 
equitable relations.201 Due to the fact that this type of power is based on solidarity, 
collaboration and the multiplication of individual power, this type of power (along 
with ‘power within’ and ‘power to’) can be categorized as ‘positive power.’202
One effect of an increase in ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ is an increased sense of 
‘power within’. ‘Power within’ works on a psychological level in that it requires that 
a person’s own perceptions about his or her capacities, potential and rights also 
change.  ‘Power within’ can be described as the capacity to imagine alternatives and 
have hope, and, working in conjunction with ‘power to’, encompasses the ability to 
define ones goals and act upon them.  In this respect, ‘power within’ resonates with 
the concept of ‘critical consciousness’, a term which     popularized by Paulo 
Freire, and one which relates to an increased understa      of and exposure to 
structural inequality inherent in social, economic and political systems. Critical 
201 Fruzsina Csaszar ‘U nderstanding the Concept of Power’ (2004) Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections
(Ruthe Alsop (ed)) at 144.
202 Ibid.
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consciousness is also understood as acting against oppressive forces in one’s own life 
as a result of this increased awareness.203
In the Empowerment Model, and as the above CAP examples reveal, ‘power to’, 
‘power with’ and ‘power within’ are intrinsically linked to the strengthening of assets 
such as increased levels of education or literacy (human assets), or confidence or 
sense of alternative options (psychological asserts).    this respect, ‘power to’, 
‘power with’, and ‘power within’ are linked to the agency component of the 
Empowerment Model. By contrast ‘power over’ is most associated with the 
opportunity structure component of the Empowerment Model.
The most commonly recognized form of power is ‘power over’, which is relational in 
the sense that it is described as the ability to act upon a person or thing. The 
underlying rationale for this form of power is that, u   ke the aforementioned forms 
of power, it is seen as a zero sum game as having this level of power necessarily 
involves taking it from someone else. In this respect power over is about a transfer or 
re-location of power. Sarah Mosedale writes that ‘this dimension of power is 
concerned with the rules and methods of legitimizing some voices and discrediting 
others’204 or, in effect, pitching people against each other.  More often than not, 
having this type of power involves dominating and preventing others from gaining it 
and as a result it has a number of ‘negative manifestations such as repression, force, 
coercion, discrimination, corruption, and abuse.205 In a political arena, those who 
control decision-making and resources have power over those who do not. When 
these are denied access to crucial resources, such as   bs, land or healthcare, 
serves to perpetuate injustice, inequality and poverty.  The CAP example 
demonstrates how discriminatory societal attitudes towards unmarried mothers are 
entrenched in both informal and informal institutions    Morocco, and act as a form 
of ‘power over’ women. Formal institutional ‘power over’ women is reflected in 
restrictive legislation, and complicated and time-consuming administrative 
203 Elena Mustakova- Possardt ‘Is there a roadmap to  critical consiousness?’ Available at 
http://www.onecountry.org/e152/e15216as_Review_Consciousness_story.htm , accessed on 1 October 2011]
204 Sarah Mosedale ‘Assessing women's empowerment: towards a conceptual framework’ (2005) 17 2
Journal of International Development 243 at 250.















requirements to obtaining a family booklet. The ‘power over’ of informal institutions 
over women is reflected in the way in which personnel in institutions such as the 
hospital, civil status office, or police station are able to use the vulnerability of 
unmarried mothers for bribery or hostile behaviour towards unmarried mothers.  
In addition to discriminatory perceptions of unmarried women being entrenched in 
various formal and informal institutions, forms of ‘power over’ may also shape how 
women behave and how they see themselves. In this respect, power over’ can also 
be used to create the aforementioned ‘false consciousnesses’ by manipulating the 
consciousness of subordinate groups and rendering them incapable of seeing that 
inequality exists.  In this respect, power over is associated with the idea of hegemony 
and ideology and an understanding that the world can exist the only way it does 
exist. Here, power is seen to shape perceptions and preferences in a way that ensures 
acceptance of the status quo as unchangeable and natural. This precludes challenges 
to the existing order because of the difficulty in imagining any other alternatives. 
In addition to organizing power into the differing levels in which it can be applied, 
Gaventa proposes that power can also be distinguished           to how visible it is.  
As a result, forms of power can also be distinguished on a scale of ‘visible’, ‘hidden’ 
or ‘invisible’ in its.206 These ca egorizations allow more effective navigation    to 
what the different levels of power entail and also serve to enhance understanding as 
to how different strategi s may be used to influence and engage different forms of 
power.
Visible power includes the observable and definable aspects of political power such 
as the formal rules, authorities, structures, institutions as well as decision-making 
procedures that perpetuate inequality. Examples of visible power include laws, 
legislatures, elections, budgets and corporate policy. Visible power can be said to 
discriminate against interests and people in two main       Firstly, those laws and 
206  John Gaventa, ‘Reflections on the Uses of the ‘Power Cube’ Approach for Analyzing the Spaces, P laces and Dynamics of 
Civil Society Participation and Engagement’(2003-2006) CFP evaluation series no 4 at 23.
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policies which may seem neutral, but which are in fact biased towards one group of 
people at the expense of others (ie in the CAP example, expressions of visible power 
include criminal and civil laws which discriminate aga     unmarried mothers.) 
Secondly, it may involve decision-making structures that are unrepresentative; by 
failing to adequately reflect the interests of the people those structures are intended to 
serve.207
Hidden power is less overt and therefore more difficult to engage. Essentially, hidden 
power is demonstrated via certain powerful interests and institutions that maintain 
power by influencing political agendas and control decision-maki g.  Society and 
government institutions (both formal and informal) exclude certain groups from such 
decision-making, their grievances made invisible (through means such as 
intimidation or co-optation) and issues such as domestic violence are effectively 
removed from being subject to state influence by being consigned to the realm of the 
private.208  As a result, political agendas are often self-serving and entrench 
inequality within systems as opposed to representing the concerns of other less 
powerful groups. In the CAP example, hidden power manifests itself in vague laws 
and procedures which are difficult to understand, or gaps where legislation is silent 
as to women’s rights. Lack of clarity inevitably results in laws and procedures being 
open to interpretation, as well as abuse of power by the authorities.209  Arguably, 
vague and incomplete laws could be the result of poor drafting, although may equally 
be attributed to a hidden, but very much conscious agenda by an elite few, whereby 
the interests of those whom the legislation purports t                                le. 
The result is that due to their marginalized and unequal status, unmarried mothers are 
most likely to suffer from these legislative ‘oversights’. 
207 Power and Empowerment Available at http://www.justassociates.org/chapthreepower.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2011.
208 Lisa VeneKlasen and Valerie Miller ‘A New Weave of Power, People & Politics: The Action Guide of Advocacy and Citizen 
Participation ’ Available at http://www.justassociates.org/tableofcontents.pdf, accessed 14 December 2009.
209 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 188 at 191.
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Invisible power can be said to shape meaning, and can    attributed to both the 
aforementioned notions of critical consciousness and the Marxist idea of false 
consciousness. Invisible power can work as a tool of socialization and a means of 
controlling information, and may render competing interests or problems invisible, 
not only from policy making decisions, but so too in the minds and consciousness of 
the various actors involved.210 In this respect it can prove to be the most insidious 
form of ‘power over’. It is this invisible dimension of ‘power over’ which relates to 
hegemony and influencing how individuals see the world and their place and their 
sense of self and inferiority or superiority within it.211 For example, in many 
societies, the poor have been taught to accept their levels of poverty as inevitable and 
have internalized feelings of worthlessness and their     inal roles in society as 
natural. This form of socialized consent or willing compliance prevents individuals 
both from envisaging or aspiring to any other possibil  ies and from questioning or 
acting to change the roles or the injustices that cause them.212 In this regard, although 
ideology pervades a variety of types, forms and spaces of power, it is best defined as 
‘invisible’ power. Ideology is a complicated structure of attitudes, values and beliefs 
and it shapes the way social reality is perceived and analyzed.213 Ideologies are 
disseminated through various formal and informal socia , political, economic and 
religious structures and institutions, such as the church, the media, the economy, and 
the state 214 which may present apparently egalitarian visible objectives, but which in
fact conceal unequal power relations that only serve to reinforce inequality.
In the CAP example, the ‘culture of silence’215 surrounding the circumstances of 
unwed mothers operates as an invisible form of ‘power       unwed mothers, which 
is created and sustained by Moroccan societal attitudes towards them. The 
of an culture of silence also in part depends on the aforementioned ‘false 
consciousness’ ie-internalized attitudes which prevent the questioning or challenge to 
the hegemony of such institutions and which are in effect a form of invisible power.
210 Institute of Development Studies ‘ Powercube: Understanding power for social change’ Available at 
http://ids.ac.uk/go/idsproject/powercube-understanding-power-for-social-change, accessed 15 December 2009.
211 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 29.
212 Institute of Development Studies ‘ Powercube: Understanding power for social change’ Available at 
http://ids.ac.uk/go/idsproject/powercube-understanding-power-for-social-change , accessed 15 December 2009.
213 Lisa VeneKlasen and Valerie Miller ‘(see note 208) at 49.
214 Ibid.
215 Stephanie Willman Bordat and Saida Kouzzi (see note 190) at 193.
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Indeed, the strength of this form of power lies in its ability to either conceal (unequal 
power relations and objectives) or be concealed (by power relations and objectives 
which appear equal). Foucault’s assertion, ‘power… is tolerable only on condition 
that it mask a substantial part of itself’ and that ‘its success is proportional to its 
ability to hide its own mechanisms’216 demonstrates the potential for the oppressive 
effects of this form of power to be far-reaching. Indeed, one such effect is that of 
false consciousness, whereby powerful interests are ab   to suppress the minds of 
subordinate groups to such an extent that they appear    operate within and be in 
consensus with a system that oppresses them. 
In addition to understanding how the different of power operate, 
consideration must be given as to citizens can act in relation to these power 
structures. From a development perspective, on a theoretical level, this requires an 
understanding of the notion of the ‘space’, surrounding these power structures or 
interests.  This thesis understands ‘space’ to be the         formal and informal 
institutions or channels, discourses and practices through which the poor or those 
working with them, can affect the decisions, relationships and policies that affect 
their lives.217  Lefebvre asserts that ‘space’ is intrinsically linked    the notion of 
power,218 and the corollary of this assertion is that space is also a key component of 
empowerment. Building upon the notion of empowerment as dependant on the 
interplay of agency and opportunity structure, space exists and operates at both 
individual and institutional levels. Individual spaces include those political, cultural, 
social and psychological spaces which people occupy and institutional spaces include 
those at local, national and global levels.  What gives the notion of space such 
potential in a development context is a person’s ability (agency) to create, shape, re-
shape, affect, or subvert spaces through a number of forms of engagement (such as 
participation or activism) with formal and institutions (opportunity structure).  
Gaventa (citing Lefebvre) reinforces this point when describing space as a social 
216 Timo Airaksinen, ‘The Rhetoric of Domination’ (1992) Rethinking Power: Thomas E Wartenberg (ed) 
at 115.
217 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 26.
218 Ibid.
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product…not simply ‘there’, a neutral container, waiting to be filled, but…a 
dynamic, humanly constructed means of control and hence domination, of power   
Similarly, levels of power do not exist in a vacuum and hidden, visible and invisible 
power occupy all forms of space. Some forms of power are more closely aligned 
with certain types of space than others, and the creation of and the way in which 
space can be engaged, will vary according to the type and form of power at work.  At 
both individual and institutional level, spaces exist and change alongside each other, 
with types, and forms of power as distinct as well as        lated dimensions.220
Gaventa states that spaces are ‘constantly opening and closing through struggles for 
legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation.’221 In this sense, spaces 
that have closed may look to re-open by creating invited spaces, or indeed provide 
the perfect platform for groups or movements to create their own enforced spaces.222
Spaces can be best understood as existing on  continuum and for     purposes of 
this thesis, three points on this continuum will be examined.  The first point is that of 
‘closed spaces’, which are closely aligned with the workings of hidden power.  
Spaces are effectively ‘closed’ by decisions, policies or regulations being made by 
certain actors, behind closed doors without any transparency or room for 
inclusion.223 In this sense, closed spaces are closely linked to ‘hidden power’ and I 
would argue that it is closed spaces, which allow hidden power to become ‘power 
over’ whereby the unchallenged voices of a select group of actors are legitimized 
through rules, policies which may very well be self serving, or at least not benefit a 
majority. In this regard, closed spaces are fertile grounds for discrimination, 
corruption and abuse. 
219 Ibid.
220 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 25.
221 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 27.
222 Ibid.
223 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 26.
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Claimed or created spaces
Another type of space is that which is ‘invited’, and      can be linked more to 
visible power structures. Invited spaces are those in   ich people are invited to 
participate, by local, national or global authorities, be they governmental or non-
governmental. Spaces in which people are invited are (as with all spaces) never 
neutral. Cornwall comments on the potential of invited spaces to become sites for 
resistance when she asserts that due to the ‘strategic reversibility224’ of power 
relations, ‘governmental practices, such as invited participation are in 
themselves…productive of possibilities for subversion, appropriation and 
reconstitution.’225 However, when considering invited spaces, such as arenas for 
participation, it is worth questioning did the inviting, the interests involved and 
the types of power that may lie behind the invitation. Indeed, issues of power 
operating behind spaces, such as hidden and invisible       which can shape the 
‘rules of the game’ may serve to undermine what appears to be equitable 
participation, but in fact only re-enforce hegemonic thinking.
Finally, there are the claimed, or created spaces226 which are claimed or created by 
the less powerful, against power holders. These are spaces that are chosen and 
therefore have an identity different from invited spaces.  These can be created by 
community groups, social movements or places where discussion, debate and 
resistance is generated outside of the institutionalized policy forums.’227 It is worth 
noting that although new spaces can have transformative potential, institutions and 
patterns of power are often deeply embedded within society. In this sense, existing 
rules of the game can be replicated and essentially limit the involvement of or indeed 
silence those participating.
224 Andrea Cornwall, ‘M aking spaces, changing places: situating participation in development’ (2002) IDS Working Paper 170 at 
9 , citing Foucault ‘Governmentality’ (1991) in G Burchell et al, The Foucault effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press at 5 .
225 Andrea Cornwall (see note 224) at 9 .
226 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 27.
227 John Gaventa (see note 206) at 27.
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The CAP field visits to the Civil Status Office arguably initially occupied the realm 
of invited space, in which unmarried mothers were invited by the authority to ask 
questions to officials about the processes behind administrative decisions. Use of this 
invited space gave rise to the opening of closed spaces by making visible those 
previously hidden decision making procedures into public forums. By doing so, this 
process made officials more accountable and decreased     opportunity for officials 
to abuse their power over women in the form of bribery or abuse, and increased 
power of women to challenge officials, should they renege on what they have stated 
publically. The overall change in attitudes of public    icials towards unmarried 
mothers, the breaking down of the culture of silence and the newly acquired power 
of unmarried mothers to question power structures are   l examples of creation of a 
new spaces in both personal and social levels.  
The above discussion provides a framework by which practitioners of the LEP 
approach may analyse and understand the various ways in which power operates and 
how empowerment may be achieved. The chapter demonstrates how use of the 
Empowerment Model reveals bo h the various sources of      idual and institutional 
power, and the interface between agency and opportunity structure as the site with 
the most potential for empowerment. The power framework builds upon this model 
and makes visible the range of ways in which power may operate, be harnessed or 
challenged. Together, the models make visible the types of interventions that are best 
placed to build upon agency, and those best suited to accessing opportunity structure.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, Moser’s gender planning framework reveals how 
strengthening agency alone lends itself to accessing practical needs, and how 
structural needs are better accessed by utilizing the  ower (such as power over) 
within the institutions (such as formal institutions)       comprise opportunity 
structure.  However, as postulated by Holland and Brooks, the site for empowerment 
does not lie with either agency or opportunity structure alone, but at the interface 
between the two. As a result, interventions that place too much emphasis on agency, 
may result in the strengthening of assets and ease access to practical needs, to the 












detriment of making long term, strategic changes to benefit the poor. Similarly, as 
has been the case with traditional rule of law interventions, too much emphasis on 
those institutions which comprise the opportunity structure limb of the 
Empowerment Model result in laws which seem beneficial to the poor on paper, but 
in practice are of little or no benefit since the intended beneficiaries are not fully 
equipped with the assets to enable them to access laws and related legal institutions. 
South Africa’s AIDS activist organization Truth and Action Campaign (‘TAC’) is an 
example of a successful legal empowerment initiative which recognized from the 
outset that empowerment depends upon a complex interaction of levels, forms and 
spaces of power and its success is due in part to the recognition thereof. Using an 
Empowerment Model and Power Framework lens, and drawing from Moser’s gender 
planning framework, chapter four examines how the TAC         with both 
individuals and institutions and utilizes a number of different forms and levels of 
power, in addition to the various spaces in which it operates in order to impact upon 
both practical and strategic needs of those affected by HIV or AIDS. The campaign’s 
awareness of and tactical engagement with the variety    ways in which power 
operates, demonstrates how the campaign is able to use the LEP approach to 
maximum effect, and how the approach is able to fulfil its full potential. 
In 2001, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, representing 47 
international      pharmaceutical companies, abandoned their court action that aimed 
to prevent the South African government from passing the Medicines Act of 1997 
(the ‘Act’). This Act allowed for the production and importation of cheaper anti-
retroviral medicines (ARVs) in South Africa than ARVs       sold by the 
pharmaceutical companies. The pharmaceutical companies argued that the 
production and importation of cheaper medicines allowed for by the Act would 
infringe their intellectual property rights and result in a significant loss of revenue for 
them. The Treatment Action Campaign (‘TAC’) is a campaign launched in South 
Africa in 1998 in response to the actions of the pharmaceuticals. The TAC’s 
objectives are to improve the affordability of and access to quality health care, and to 
Chapter 4: The Treatment and Action campaign (TAC) – A Realisation of the 
Potential Power of the Legal Empowerment Approach











prevent and eliminate new HIV infections. The TAC acted as amicus curiae (friend 
of the court) in support of the government, and on behalf of people living with or 
affected by HIV or AIDS in South Africa to argue in support of the Act. To 
strengthen its campaign, the TAC mobilized local and international activist support, 
held public demonstrations which were designed to embarrass the companies228 and 
to influence global public opinion in favour of the government.229 The case was 
dropped in the face of significant international public pressure and increasingly 
negative perceptions about the pharmaceutical industry. In 2003, the South African 
government agreed to distribute anti–retroviral medication (‘ARVs’) to people living 
with or affected by HIV or AIDS,230 a course of action it had previously resisted. 
These events can mainly be attributed to the work of the TAC. The TAC combined   
number of legal and other development related strategies (such as human rights 
education, HIV treatment literacy, public demonstrations) and enlisted the support of 
a broad cross section of society (ranging from church groups, politicians, scientists, 
NGOs, gay rights groups to trade unions) to campaign for the right to health.  As a 
result, many TAC strategies may be identified with the Legal Empowerment 
Approach to development, and exemplify how the Legal Empowerment Approach 
may empower citizens, in this case, those affected by     or AIDS. A central 
concept of each campaign strategy and one vital to its success was its recognition 
both of how power works at the level of agency and opp    nity structure and how 
power at both levels may be harnessed to empower those affected by the HIV virus. 
As a result of its strategies, the TAC ensured the red       of the price of ARV 
medicine, prevented thousands of HIV-related deaths and redirected state resources 
into the health system and towards the poor.231
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of the TAC campaign from 1999 
to 2003,232 details the various challenges the campaign faced during this period and 
discusses the link between poverty and HIV/AIDS. The second part of the chapter 
228Sean Jacobs and Krista Johnson ‘Media, Social Movement                     eting Images of HIV/AIDS in South Africa’
(2007), African Studies Quarterly, Vol 9, Issue 4 at 8 .
229Ibid.
230 Note that HIV is a virus, and AIDS is a clinical syndrome, but for the purposes of this thesis, reference will be made to  
‘people affected by HIV’ in order to  encompass all those affected by the virus or syndrome. This referenc   erm is recommended 
by UN AIDS Terminology Guidelines, October 2011, accessed at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/do      s/unaidspublication/2011/JC2118_terminology-guidelines_en.pdf
on 9 November 2012.
231  Mark Heywood, ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining La    d Social Mobilzation to  Realise the Right 
to  Health’ (2009). Journal of Human Rights Practice Vol 1 , Number 1, pp 14-36 at 24. 
232 Whilst the TAC continues its activities to  the present day, due to  the time frame examined in this chapter, the past tense will 
be used to  describe TAC’s activities











acknowledges the internal and external obstacles and barriers limiting access to ARV 
treatment inherent within individuals, organizations and formal and informal 
institutions. Using the Holland and Brook Empowerment Model and Gaventa’s 
Power Framework as lenses, the chapter proceeds to argue that the TAC’s founders 
recognized that overcoming barriers to treatment would depend upon a combination 
of strengthening the individual agency of those affected by HIV/AIDS and 
harnessing the support and strength of organizations and              that comprised 
the opportunity structure. 
The TAC was launched on 10 December 1998 (‘Human Rights Day’ in South 
Africa) by a small group of political activists, led by Zackie Achmat.233 The TAC 
was launched in response to a court action brought by  harmaceutical companies 
against the South African government. The action brought by the pharmaceuticals 
aimed to prevent the passing of the proposed Medicines Act (‘the       that allowed 
for the importation of cheaper generic medication to South Africa, including ARVs. 
The pharmaceutical companies argued that the production and importation of 
cheaper medicines would infringe their intellectual property rights and result    a 
significant loss of revenue for them. Acting as amicus curiae to the government and 
on behalf of people affected by HIV in South Africa, the TAC argued in support of 
the Act. The fundamental belief shared by TAC activists was that equitable access to 
health care, in particular HIV medicines, is a human right.234 The TAC argued that 
the cost of medicines, including ARVs supplied by the     maceutical companies 
was prohibitively expensive for the majority of South Africans affected by HIV, 
thereby preventing those affected from accessing treatment, and in effect, denying 
their right to health care. The TAC argued that the de     of the right to health care 
also violates a range of other human rights such as the right to dignity, equality and 
education that had been, since 1996, entrenched in the South African Constitution. 
The TAC campaign involved the mobilization of thousands of people affected by 
HIV and the influence of national and international supporters ranging from non -
233Mark Heywood (see 231) at 15.
234 Ibid.
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governmental and community based organizations to famous individuals, to 
strengthen its campaign. The case was dropped under significant national and 
international pressure on the pharmaceuticals and in 2003, the South African 
government agreed to distribute ARVs to people living with HIV or AIDS,
Following this victory, TAC expected that the government would begin to distribute 
ARVs at various public health facilities. However, instead, the government rejected 
or delayed implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment regimes  ‘either 
on principle or until lengthy ‘pilot programs’ were un         to test them.’235 In 
practice, this meant that access to ARV drug therapy for those living with HIV was 
also denied. The government cited a number of interrelated reasons for this 
intransigence. President Thabo Mbeki and the incumbent health Minister Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang questioned the accuracy of HIV testing, the link between HIV 
and the viral cause of AIDS, and doubted the efficacy and safety of HIV treatment.236
AIDS activists refer to this set of beliefs as AIDS ‘denialism.’237  The cost of rolling 
out comprehensive HIV prevention and treatment plans was another issue raised by 
the government. From as early as 1998, the government       the question of 
affordability as the principle reason behind its inabi ity to introduce a drug based 
prevention and treatment regime.238 The government’s reasoning related not only to 
the costs of procuring drugs, but also those associated with a treatment plan, such as 
the costs of providing counselling and formula milk.239 As a result of the 
government’s reticence to roll out prevention and treatment programs, a lengthy and 
bitter battle from 1999 to 2003 between TAC and the government ensued. This was 
dominated by issues pertaining to AIDS denialism and the affordability of HIV 
prevention and treatment programs. 
235 Steven Friedman and Shauna Mottiar A Rewarding Engagement? The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of 
HIV/AIDS at 514 available at 
http://www.ne wschool.edu/uploadedfiles/tcds/democracy_and_diversity_institutes/friedman%20and%20mottiar_rewarding%20e
ngagement.pdf accessed on 27 October 2012.
236 Note that although this chapter focuses upon the decisions made by President Mbeki and Health Minister 
MantoTshabalalaMsimang,  a num ber of national ministri   such as finance, trade and industry, have key roles with regards to  
AIDS policy and implementation. Similarly, provincial governments have a key role in implementing AIDs treatment and 
prevention strategies. This thesis will refer to  the ‘government’ for ease of reference.
237 led by President Thabo Mbeki and supported by the Health Minister MantoTshabalala-Msimang.
238 Neil Overy, ‘In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and 
Litigation’ (2011) International Budget Partnership, Study No. 7 , at 2 .
239 Ibid.











In July 2002, the Constitutional Court found that the         nt had acted in an
‘unreasonable and unconstitutional’240 way in its failure to provide a comprehensive 
program to prevent the transition of HIV from mother to child (‘MTCT’).  As a 
result, the court ordered the government to supply the ARV ‘Nevirapine,’ to prevent 
MTCT.241 This was followed by an even greater victory in August the following 
year, when the national Cabinet decided to extend the              of ARVs to 
everyone living with HIV.242 In August 2003, the government announced that the 
DoH had been instructed to draw up a plan for an ARV program in S.A and a plan 
was approved in November 2003 by the cabinet. To date, the TAC continues its 
campaign to ensure that people living with HIV have access to comprehensive HIV 
prevention and treatment services. However, this chapter will explore TAC’s 
campaign from its inception, until the approval of the ARV plan in 2003, and as a 
result will use the past tense when referring to TAC campaigns. The following 
section provides an overview of the individual and structural barriers behind the HIV 
epidemic and the various ways in which TAC strategies sought to overcome these.
South Africa is the region of the world most affected    the HIV epidemic.243 The 
relationship between poverty and HIV transmission is complex and linked to a 
number of structural inequalities (for example those pertaining to race or gender) 
including those which give rise to poverty. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
examine the relationship between poverty and HIV in detail, but it is significant to 
note that economic, social and physiological factors that render people vulnerable to 
and therefore at a higher risk of HIV infection are aggravated by poverty. Risk 
factors which result in the poor being more vulnerable HIV on health grounds 
include; limited access to health care (for example due to the lack of availability of 
health services in poor areas, and the concomitant cos   of accessing and paying for 
such services), which in turn decreases the possibility of having sexually transmitted 
240 Friedman and Mottiar (see note 235) at 514.
241 Amy Kapczynski and Jonathan M. Berger The Story of the TAC C ase: The Potential and Limits of Socio-Economic Rights 
Litigation in South Africa, at 20 available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/faculty/facultyPubsPDF.php?facID=7238&pubID=2 accessed on 10 November 2012.
242 Ibid.
243 Mark Heywood (see note 231) at 14.
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infections treated thereby increasing the risk of HIV infection;   lack information 
about their HIV status; and the crowded and unsanitary conditions in which many 
poor are forced to live, with limited access to clean      , and increased exposure to 
other diseases such as malaria or tuberculosis.244 In addition to the risk of HIV 
infection being aggravated by poverty, the impact of living with HIV or AIDS can 
further impoverish people and thereby intensify the epidemic.245 Those affected are 
often unable to maintain jobs due to the effects of the disease. This may lead to a 
reduction in their household income, or require househ    resources to be diverted to 
their medical, care and funeral expenses. Those affected may pass away leaving 
elderly or very young in their households who need care, thereby placing additional 
burdens on households, and other family members or friends with the increased costs 
associated with this care.246
Much of the success of the TAC campaign was due to the recognition that 
transmission of the HIV virus is often via ‘social fault lines created by poverty, 
inequality and social injustice’247 and that the HIV epidemic is therefore a symptom 
of a social and political imbalance of power, money and resources. This close 
correlation between structural inequalities giving rise to poverty,      l injustice and 
the transmission of the virus would suggest that ‘any barrier or obstacle … that limits 
access to treatment for HIV in the public and private         as set out in TAC’s 
Constitution248 also correlate closely with those barriers or obstacles that create and 
sustain poverty. 
TAC leaders recognized that the obstacles and barriers that were limiting access to 
treatment comprised both external and internal obstacles. External obstacles included 
the way that power manifests in formal and informal institutions, (collectively 
defined by North as the ‘rules of the game’) and organizations (as distinct from, but 
exerting influence upon and influenced by formal and informal institutions). Internal 
M.J. Kelly C. Desmond D. Cohen, The impacts of HIV/AIDS on de velopment at 36, available at 
http://www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Cap_Dev_Training/pdf/1_1.pdf accessed on 15 November 2013.
245  Economic and Social Development Department, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations – The impact of 
HIV/AIDS on rural households  and land issues in Southern and Eastern Africa page 1 available at 
http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ad696e/ad696e04.htm   August 2002
246 Ibid.
247  Mark Heywood (see note 231) at 15.
248 Treatment Action Campaign 2004 Constitution of TAC.











obstacles comprise individual barriers such as the psychological barriers of those 
affected by HIV.
Informal and formal institutions and organizations comprise the ‘Opportunity 
Structure’ component of the Empowerment Model, ie the context within which those 
affected by HIV operate, and which have the potential    assist or constrain their 
ability to transform agency into effective action, or      specifically, accessing 
ARVs.
Formal institutions include, for example, laws codifying pharmaceutical companies’ 
patent rights, thereby preventing access by South Africans to inexpensive medicines, 
including ARVs. Informal institutions include accepted societal norms, such as the 
stigma attached to HIV and its treatment, and the way in which those affected could 
be ostracized from their communities..249 The way in which power was manifested 
through organizations is exemplified by the choices made by decision makers within 
the DoH not to proceed with the roll out of PMTCT or ARV programs, thereby 
denying life saving drugs to millions affected by HIV. 
Internal obstacles comprise the ‘Agency’ component of     Empowerment Model. 
These are factors such as psychological barriers that   nstrain individual agency, and 
reminiscent of Golub’s definition of the LEP approach, are factors that limit the 
control that affected persons have over their lives. Internal barriers are influenced by 
external factors such as the stigma (informal institutions) attached to HIV and its 
treatment. The remainder of the chapter sets out a num    of TAC strategies to 
illustrate how, by working on both the level of agency and opportunity structure 
components of the Empowerment Model, TAC strategies empowered those affected 
by HIV to challenge and overcome internal and external obstacles, and access ARV 
treatment. TAC strategies worked to strengthen individual assets of thousands of 
people affected by HIV who were able to collectively mobilize, assert their rights, 
challenge government decisions, and campaign for change. TAC strategies also 
accessed and engaged the support of a number of institutions and organizations 
comprising opportunity structure. A number of TAC strategies identified below as 
249 Steven Robins ‘Khululeka – From Social Movement to  Men’s Support Group A Case Study of Aids Activism in Guguletu, 
Cape Town’, Participatory Governance? (2007) Citizens and the State in South Africa (Lisa Thompson (ed)) African Centre for 
Citizenship and Democracy at 15.











directly affecting individual agency, such as the Openness Strategy and the 
Treatment Literacy Campaign, were also responsible for influencing and engaging 
informal and formal institutions and organizations com        opportunity structure. 
Similarly, campaigns more focused upon engaging the opportunity structure 
component, for example the formal institution of the media, also had implications for 
individual agency.  In order to analyse such strategies were able to empower 
people affected by HIV, the chapter analyses TAC strategies using the Power 
Framework to highlight how different forms of power operating at the levels of 
agency and opportunity structure were engaged, harnessed, strengthened and 
challenged.
TAC leaders had a keen awareness of the existence of barriers at both individual 
(agency) and structural (opportunity structure) levels to accessing ARV treatment. 
This awareness influenced the way in which TAC strategies were shaped, and the 
tools and tactics it used to both challenge and harness the ways in which power 
operates at the structural and individual agency levels. 
The following section provides a brief overview of how TAC’s campaign strategies 
were able to strengthen the agency of people affected by the virus by building      a 
variety of assets, e gaging interrelated forms of power and creating spaces for action. 
TAC strategies that aimed to strengthen individual agency ranged from human rights 
education, HIV treatment literacy and civil disobedience campaigns to holding mass 
demonstrations and undertaking litigation. Such strategies strengthened a range of 
assets. For example, TAC strategies equipped those affected with HIV with both a 
comprehensive understanding of the virus and health related issues, and an 
awareness of the structural inequalities underpinning     epidemic.  Strategies sought 
how
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to enable those affected by HIV to envisage and campaign for change, and build the 
confidence and ability of those facing the stigmatizing epidemic to speak out in 
public places.250 The corollary of strengthening individual assets was an increase in 
individuals’ ‘power to’ act, exercise choice and make           affecting their lives. 
As examples of ‘power with,’ thousands of individuals       ed by HIV mobilized to 
form collective strength and joined forces with institutions and organizations to 
challenge the pharmaceuticals and government decisions Arguably, a combination of 
individual and collective strength also facilitated an increased sense of self esteem 
and ability within affected persons to imagine alternative options (‘power within’). 
Such large-scale mobilization also exemplifies how the TAC created a democratic 
space in which newly active citizens affected by HIV were able to mobilize, protest, 
assert their rights and challenge the prevailing power structures and actions of 
government and multinational pharmaceuticals.251 By doing so, the campaign was 
able to exercise  ‘power over’ the actions of the pharmaceuticals and the DoH, with 
the threat of international disdain, and negative publicity.  In this sense, the TAC 
created a space by which the power of individual agency (ie power to, and power 
within) became the power of collective agency (power with) to prevent, challenge or 
influence the actions of organizations, formal and informal institutions comprising 
opportunity structure (power over). In this respect, and reminiscent of Golub’s 
definition of ‘empowerment’, TAC members were able to         the rules of the 
game.’  
The next section examines in more detail how two campaign strategies worked to 
strengthen agency, by analyzing both how assets were strengthened and the way in 
which power operated could be influenced. Firstly, the section will examine the
TAC’s ‘Openness’ strategy, which facilitated ‘power within’ by strengthening 
individuals’ psychological assets by challenging the culture of silence surrounding 
the HIV epidemic and enabling those affected by HIV to construct a new identity in 
relation to the virus. The section proceeds to discuss the Treatment Literacy 
Campaign which built upon the human assets of education and literacy, to enable 
250 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 12.
251 Neil Overy (see note 238) at 12 citing S. Friedman and S. Mottiar, ‘Seeking the High Ground: The Treatment Action 
Campaign and the Politics of Morality’, in R. Ballard (et al), Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, Scottsville, 2006 at 32.











individuals the ’power to’ access information about the virus, the capacity to 
envisage change, challenge accepted norms and demand their rights.
Describing the social and cultural dimensions of the e         Steven Robins252
highlights how the profound stigma surrounding the HIV virus resulted in the virus 
being consigned to the realm of the individual and the private, in which those 
affected suffered in silence. In addition to the threat of a physical death, those living 
with HIV also experienced a ‘social death’ in which they were often ostracized from 
their communities, to suffer or die of AIDS in silence and relative anonymity. In his 
‘Case Study of AIDS Activism in Guguletu, Cape Town,’253 Robins illustrates the 
reality of this when recounting the film ‘Yesterday’ which depicts a true story of a 
migrant miner returning from Gauteng to his home villa   in KwaSulu-Natal to 
prepare to die from AIDS. Robins describes how ‘both the dying man and his wife 
are stigmatized and isolated by most of the villagers254’ resulting in his eventual 
‘painful and humiliating death.’255 .
In effect, the culture of silence and stigma surrounding the HIV virus and its 
treatment operates as an invisible form of ‘power over’ those affected by the virus, 
which is perpetuated by societal attitudes (an informal institution), which operate as 
a form of external barrier to accessing treatment by s       the way HIV is 
perceived in society. Arguably, these informal institutions also shape how those 
affected behave and see themselves by preventing them from speaking openly about 
their HIV status due to the shame and stigma surrounding the virus, and the threat of 
being ostracized from their communities should their HIV status be revealed. In 
effect, these informal institutions operate as a form of ‘false consciousness256’ acting 
as a tool of socialization in the minds and consciousness of those affected by HIV.  
The power of a culture of silence depends upon the way in which ‘false 
consciousness’ prevents those affected by HIV questioning or challenging the 
252 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 10.
253 Ibid
254 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 9 .
255 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 18.
256 as more fully set out in chapter 2 .
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difficulties in accessing HIV treatment. In this regard, false consciousness operates 
as an internal (psychological) barrier of those affected to access to treatment. 
One of the TAC’s political strategies that sought to counteract the culture of silence 
surrounding the HIV virus,257 was its campaign of ‘Openness.’ The Openness 
campaign worked at both the level of agency by encouraging the assertion of identity 
of those affected by HIV, and on a structural level by promoting HIV activism on a 
wider scale. The campaign,
‘successfully advocated for the transformation of the        of living with HIV 
into a “badge of pride”’ that was displayed publicly on T-shirts at 
demonstrations, township funerals, and other public spaces.’258
This courageous approach was adopted by thousands of HIV activists, and carried 
significant political potential by creating new space     the re-framing of the way 
HIV was perceived by both civil society and those living with the virus.259 Applying 
the Empowerment Model lens to individual agency, the Openness strategy built upon 
psychological assets by facilitating contact and information sharing and building 
strong supportive communities between affected persons, AIDS organizations and 
other supporters. Arguably, membership of such communities facilitated ‘power 
within’ those affected by HIV by counteracting any self-perceived exclusion from 
the community, enabling people to ‘[construct] a new p        HIV positive 
identity’260 and to envisage change.
Moreover, the fostering of a new culture of openness,            d the power of 
those affected to envisage and create change. The articulation by those with HIV of 
the fact that they were living with the virus, not only subverted the culture of silence, 
but also became an assertion of identity and fostered a culture of openness and 
belonging. 
On a structural level, the Openness Strategy operated  y subverting informal 
institutions such as negative, uninformed attitudes in order to foster a more 
257 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 12.
258 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 15.
259 Mark Heywood (see note 231) at 28.
260 Ibid.











understanding and supportive culture in both national and international communities 
of people affected by the virus. Furthermore, the strategy served to situate the 
epidemic firmly within systemic issues of contemporary South African issues 
pertaining to race, class and poverty. This was achieved by locating the virus within 
activists’ bodies, as opposed to confining it solely to private arenas (such as the 
courtroom) for debate, and thereby succeeded in providing a running political 
commentary, in which activists ‘ill bodies…were living reminders of national and 
global inequality with respect to drug availability.’261 Indeed, the epidemic was 
transformed from something invisible and deniable to one affecting the lives of 
millions of very visible and vocal people. The disclosure of the virus on a massive 
scale by millions suffering from it, and the elimination of the culture of silence and 
taboo surrounding HIV and AIDS was vital to the demand  and the success of the 
campaign. This culture of openness in turn helped to raise public awareness and 
understanding about issues surrounding the affordability, availability and use of HIV 
treatments which strengthened the TAC’s campaign by engaging public national and 
international support and creating a large constituency of people demanding their 
rights. In this respect, personal empowerment also became political empowerment. 
The above example is illustrative of the way in which    the strengthening of 
individual agency on a large scale had implications for the institutions and 
organizations comprising opportunity structure.  An increase in public awareness and 
support for the campaign also resulted in increased pressure on the pharmaceutical 
companies to drop their action against the government, and later, pressure on the 
government to roll out a comprehensive HIV treatment and prevention plan. In this 
respect, collective agency impacted both informal inst         and organizations 
comprising opportunity structure. 
A second campaign was the Treatment Literacy Campaign          which focused 
upon building individual agency by teaching those affected by HIV to understand 
261Ibid.
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and become literate about the virus262 whilst simultaneously locating the virus within 
its wider political and social context. In this regard, the TLC  lso engaged the 
‘critical consciousness’ of those affected by raising    ir awareness of the structural 
inequalities inherent in the social, economic and political systems affecting the virus 
and its treatment.
The philosophy behind the TLC campaign was that by understanding the virus, 
people would take more ownership of their bodies in respect of preventative 
measures and treatment of their illness. Treatment literacy information was 
disseminated through a range of educational materials, including: booklets, posters 
and videos, which were combined with a comprehensive training program. Training 
topics included (a) the science and epidemiology of HIV (b) nutrition (c) the benefits 
of treatment, prevention, mother to child transmission (‘MTCT’) as well as (d) legal 
rights, and global issues involving HIV and AIDS.263 People who received training 
and reached a satisfactory standard were appointed as            literacy 
practitioners’ (‘TLPs’). TLPs were assigned to conduct education workshops in 
clinics, NGOs, villages, churches and community organizations to ensure continuity 
of education on all aspects of the epidemic. Workshops created space for people to 
disclose their stories, ask questions and experience group solidarity, whilst 
simultaneously promoting a political and social underpinning to their education by 
linking it to human rights, equality and the political economy (ie how the interplay of 
politics and economics shaped government decisions regarding treatment).  In this 
regard, the TLC encouraged a form of critical consciousness in individuals (a form of 
‘power within’), regarding their place and situation within society, and the social and 
political factors underpinning this. Thus, an informed understanding of the illness -
its causes, effects and treatments - and the ability to locate this within the broader 
political context created ‘empowered citizens.’264 TAC leaders recognized that 
treatment literacy increased individuals’ capacity to          change, challenge 
accepted societal norms, exercise choice and demand their rights. In this regard, 
access to information was an essential tool of citizenship, which enabled those 
affected by HIIV to tackle the inequalities of power inherent within the South 
African healthcare system.
262 Steven Robins (see note 249) at 11.
263Mark Heywood (see note 231) at 17 and 18.
264  ibid.











11.5 TAC Empowerment Strategies at the level of Opportunity Structure
The last section considered how TAC strategies worked    strengthen the agency of 
people affected by HIV and how agency on a collective    le had implications for 
the institutions and organizations comprising opportunity structure. This included
subverting the culture of silence surrounding the virus and raising the profile of the 
campaign, which worked to increase pressure on the government to roll out a 
comprehensive HIV treatment and prevention plan. This section considers the TAC 
strategies that worked directly towards engaging and harnessing forms of power 
within organizations (such as the DoH), formal and informal institutions (such as the 
South African Constitution and national and international public opinion) comprising 
opportunity structure.  Strategies included negotiations with executive government 
(DoH), utilizing the power of decisions made by the Constitutional Court over the 
DoH, and harnessing the power of mass mobilization and civil disobedience 
campaigns to engage support within the international community to influence the 
government.  
Unlike many other African countries, South Africa has a number of strong, working 
institutions, (for example, a well developed legal system, a Constitutional Court, a 
free press, and a Constitution which enshrines the human rights of South Africans). 
However, the TAC recognized that despite the existence of institutions and of 
enshrined rights or pro-poor laws, in reality a gulf exists between rights and their 
realization. Rather, the translation of rights on paper into rights in practice depends 
upon how power is exercised by the politics and interests of decision makers.  The 
Minister of Health and the President were the key decision makers regarding access 
to ARV and PMTCT treatment. Their decisions regarding treatment were influenced 
by the interplay of politics and economics. The Minister of Health’s decision that the 
costs associated with the roll out of PMTCT and ARV programs were unaffordable, 
and President Thabo Mbeki’s questioning of the ‘toxicity’ of ARV treatments and 
the link between HIV and AIDS, shaped a political economy which led to significant 
delay in treatment for millions of people living with      The government’s inaction 
was exacerbated by the fact that Mbeki employed a number of consultants who 
reflected his own denialist beliefs to advise him in ways which, added weight to his 











‘consultation’ may have appeared to have invited advice or challenge by consultants 
and thereby occupy the realm of ‘visible power’ and ‘invited space’265 in reality, 
decisions continued to be made in closed spaces in accordance with beliefs held by a 
minority of people in politically powerful positions.    an example of how closed 
spaces are closely aligned with hidden power, space for civil society participation in 
government decision making processes was effectively c      by its being denied 
access to government plans and policy documents that would ordinarily be in the 
public domain.266 Nattrass asserts that throughout Mbeki’s presidency, ‘important 
reports on causes of death, maternal mortality and HIV prevalence were delayed and 
sometimes doctored.267’ The process of non-disclosure, delay and doctoring, acted as 
a form of hidden ‘power over’ those affected by HIV. By             the politics of 
the situation in closed spaces, keeping items off the  olitical agenda and leaving 
voices of a select minority unchallenged, hidden power was able to become ‘power 
over’ millions of less powerful people affected by HIV, thereby      ing their 
choices and denying them their right to health. 
The following section provides examples of how TAC strategies engaged, utilized or 
challenged forms of power within institutions and organizations comprising 
opportunity structure. The section proceeds to focus on the TAC’s PMTCT and ARV 
programs respectively, and the particular strategies used to counteract government 
claims regarding the toxicity and unaffordable nature of such programs. 
.
In order to challenge, influence or counteract the cla    of the Health Minister and 
President, TAC strategies sought to harness equally powerful political, scientific, or 
legal support, make visible hidden government agendas, and create spaces268 for 
lobbying, protest and resistance.
265 Note the typology referred to  in chapter 3  which depicts different types of ‘space’ in which po wer may operate.
266 Heywood, Civil Society and Uncivil Government, The Treatment Action Campaign ( TAC) versus Thabo Mbeki, 1998-2008 
(In publication ‘ In  Mbeki and After, Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki, Ed D Glaser, Wits University Press, 2010)) at 
15.
267 Ibid – Heywood citing Nattrass at 15. (Nattrass, N. 2007. Mor                   nialism and the Struggle for 
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12. Engaging Opportunity Structure - Strategic alliances with institutions, 
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On a domestic scale, the TAC built large networks of local supporters, ranging from 
influential political figures, such as Nelson Mandela, to alliances with organizations 
such as the Catholic Church (despite the Catholic church’s opposition to the use of 
condoms).  In addition, the TAC aligned itself to South Africa’s largest and 
extremely powerful trade union, the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(‘COSATU’), despite COSATU’s partnership with the ANC government. In this 
respect the TAC sought commonality among differing interests and built collective 
strength with COSATU and the Catholic Church. These al iances demonstrate the 
TAC’s use of ‘power with’ such organizations to develop shared values and foster 
critical and strategic political support.  On an international scale, the TAC found 
support in civil society organizations (such as the Stop AIDS Campaign) that 
organized worldwide events in support of the TAC, enabling the TAC to gain 
leverage and power to secure international disdain for and opposition to both 
pharmaceutical company actions and ANC government policies.269
The TAC used the South African Constitution as a legal, moral and political tool by 
which to discredit the DoH’s claims and to frame its campaign for the right to life, 
health, and other socio-economic rights (such as the right to social security and social 
assistance,270 which are enshrined in the Constitution). The purpose of the 
campaign’s use of the Constitution was two-fold: judicial enforcement of socio -
economic rights, and to use the moral and legal weight of the Constitution to 
influence public opinion and garner national and international support. This strategy 
demonstrates how the TAC used a formal institution to exert power over the 
government by using the Constitution as a tool to inform the campaign’s lobbying, 
strengthen its protests, and ultimately force the government to be accountable for its 
actions. 
Furthermore, campaign strategies sought to harness the power and support of the 
mass media (formal institution), using newsprint, the radio, television and Internet as 
269  Neil Overy (see note 238) at 9 .
270 The South African Constitution, Section 27 .













a tool by which to broadcast its messages, lobby, and          a high profile and 
constant visibility for the campaign. One political analyst noted that the TAC 
‘achieved extraordinary media visibility and shaped public opinion through 
sophisticated networking and media imaging.’271 The support of the media also 
assisted the TAC campaign to bolster its Openness Strategy by bringing the 
discussion of HIV from previously closed, private spaces, into a public space, 
thereby also working to transform the informal institution of a culture of silence.
The following section demonstrates how, through the use of formal institutions and 
organizations, the TAC’s campaign sought to influence the political and economic 
reasoning relied upon by the government to inform its    isions to delay the roll out 
of both ARV and PMTCT treatment. 
The TAC conducted extensive research to demonstrate that preventing new HIV 
infections by implementing PMTCT was cost effective. The TAC’s research was 
strengthened by using scientific opinion contained within a series of affidavits to 
counteract Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Health’s claims regarding the 
unaffordable cost of PMTCT programs and the toxicity of treatment. Affidavits by 
experts included Dr Mark Wainberg, one of the world’s  ost prominent 
virologists272 and Professor Nicoli Nattrass, a health economist. Nattrass showed that 
public funds could be saved by spending money on PMTCT programs that would 
reduce future HIV infections.273 In December 2001, the High Court found in favour 
of the TAC, and ordered the government to draw up a national programme for the 
PMTCT using Nevirapine.274 An appeal by the government to the Constitutional 
Court, in July 2002 failed. The TAC’s use of medical professionals and health 
economists demonstrates how the TAC moved beyond demands that the government 
271 Steven Robins, ‘Long Live Zackie, Long Live’: AIDS Activism, Science and Citizenship after Apartheid at 14, available at 
http://www.dfid.go v.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CentreOnCitizenship/long_live_zackie.pdf accessed on 1 November 2012.
272 Amy K apezynski & Jonathan M Berger The Story of the TAC  case: The Potential and Limits of Socio-Economic Rights 
LItitagion in South Africa, at 16, available at (
) accessed on 15 October 2011.
273 Affadiavit C.C Nattrass, 15 August 2001, section 23, available at, www.tac.org.za/documents/MTC TCourtCase/ccmnnatt.rtf, 
accessed on 10 November 2011.
274 Nevirapine was cleared for use for PMTC T in SA by the Medicines Control Council in April 2001 , 
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comply with legal obligations and used scientific and economic opinion to counteract 
the Ministry of Health claims that PMTCT or ARV programs were unaffordable or 
toxic. Scientists and researchers also developed policy proposals that met the 
‘reasonableness’ requirements that jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court had 
repeatedly said the government must comply with, thereby increasing pressure on the 
government to comply with TAC’s demands.275
On 1 December 2000, the South African Minister of Health announced the 
government’s decision not to implement a large- scale antiretroviral program, 
echoing its previous argument that the program was ‘unaffordable.’276 In order to 
counteract these claims, the TAC formed a committee of medical professionals and 
health economists to produce a draft National Treatment Plan (NTP) based on the 
costs of medicines and the associated delivery costs.  This NTP became pivotal to 
TAC advocacy, and in 2002, the TAC and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) convened a National HIV/AIDS Treatment Congress.  Following 
the congress, the TAC began negotiations for a NTP with labour, business leaders 
and government representatives at the National, Economic, Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC). This enabled formal engagement with       and business 
leaders, whilst simultaneously creating a new space for the discussion of HIV related 
issues and moving it ‘beyond the exclusive power of the Minister of Health- over 
these decision, but still keeping government within discussions.’277 This 
demonstrates how, from a previously closed forum, (NEDLAC was tripartite in its 
composition and excluded civil society), the TAC used ‘power with’ COSATU to
strategically ‘create space’ for itself at the negotiating table. 
The TAC placed two research papers that considered the effect a NTP would have on 
AIDS related deaths, and a costing exercise of a NTP before NEDLAC. At the end of 
275 Heywood, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilizatin to  Realize the Right of Health 
at 21, quoting Berger, J 2008 ‘The ABC of Drug Access: Reflections of a Pharma-basher.’ Paper presented to  SA H IV Clinicians 
Society, February 2008.
276 (Minister of Health, Speech on World Aids Day, 1  December 2000).
277 Neil Overy (see note 243) at 5 . 
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2002, NEDLAC reached a draft agreement on a national plan for the roll out of 
ARVs. The government immediately rejected this draft agreement. In response, the 
TAC announced a civil disobedience campaign that included public demonstrations, 
refusal to leave police stations until the TAC’s demands were met, and heckling the 
Minister of Health at public events, all of which generated significant amounts of 
publicity. The heckling at public events exemplifies how the TAC used subverted the 
use of a public space to create a site for resistance. Other civil disobedience strategies 
reveal how the TAC was able to create new spaces for debate and discussion outside 
of typical forums and increase pressure on the government to implement ARV 
programs. 
On 8 August 2003, the government announced that the DoH had been instructed to 
draw up a plan for an ARV program in S.A and a plan was approved in November 
2003 by the cabinet. 
As set out above, the main obstacles to accessing ARV treatment can largely be 
grouped into two categories: the internal psychological obstacles of those affected by 
HIV and external obstacles in the form of decisions, actions and inaction of
organizations such as the pharmaceuticals and the DoH respectively. The TAC 
leaders recognized that the changes required by the TAC strategies to overcome both 
forms of obstacles were intimately bound to how power manifests. 
As a result, TAC strategies demonstrated a keen awareness of who has power, how it 
changes according to who is using it (ie individuals affected by HIV, government 
officials, scientific institutions or famous individuals) where it is being used, (ie
locally, nationally or globally), which form it takes (ie visible, hidden or invisible) 
and which type of space it operates within (invited, closed, created). 
From an Empowerment Framework perspective, TAC strateg    such as the 
Openness and Treatment Literacy campaign worked directly to strengthen the agency 












of individuals and the types of power such as ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power 
within’ usually associated with it. The Treatment Literacy Campaign worked by 
building human assets, including levels of education and literacy regarding the virus; 
psychological assets whereby membership of the TAC arguably worked towards 
counteracting self perceived exclusion from the community, increased levels of 
interaction with people in different social groups, and encouraged those affected by 
HIV to envisage change; access to information, such as increased access to 
information concerning the virus and the broader socio-economic structures 
surrounding it; and organizational capacity, such as t   membership of TAC. 
Viewing such strategies through the Power Framework reveals how building the 
assets of individuals strengthens agency by increasing a sense of ‘power within’ to 
envisage change and feel a sense of belonging.  Another type of power associated 
with Agency, and one increased by the TLC’s was the ‘power to’ question power 
relations and the structural inequalities embedded within institutions and 
organizations that underpin the HIV epidemic. Finally, the Openness Strategy
strengthened the form of ‘power with’ by creating a community of activists with 
common concerns and a campaign with a unified voice and fostering a sense of 
belonging.
TAC leaders recognized that while strengthening individual agency is a vital 
component of empowerment, power relations in society are shaped by wider political 
systems. In the TAC example, the wider political system included the decisions of 
powerful actors such as President Mbeki and the Minister of Health to determine 
who has access to HIV treatment. As a result, TAC campaigns focused on harnessing 
or challenging the power embodied within the institutions and organizations 
comprising opportunity structure or the ‘rules of the             iety in order to shift 
the balance of power between powerful individuals within such institutions and those 
living with HIV. In order to do so, TAC strategies focused both directly and 
indirectly on the opportunity structure component of the Empowerment Framework.
Although working to increase the agency of individuals, the Openness strategy 












force with visible and politicized demands. By simultaneously engaging the support 
of a range of organizations, (for example trade unions, scientific bodies, and NGOs) 
and the strength of formal institutions (such as the socio-economic rights enshrined 
in the South African Constitution or the far reaching    luence of multiple forms of 
media) the campaign was able to use ‘power with’ other institutions and 
organisations in order harness ‘power over’ the actions of the pharmaceuticals and 
the DoH with the threat of international disdain, and negative publicity.
By understanding how different forms of power operated within agency and 
opportunity structures, TAC leaders were also better equipped to understand how the 
different types of ‘space’, could be used by its campaigns to affect power structures. 
As a result, TAC strategies used spaces tactically as   ll as strategically to exert 
pressure and influence government decision-making. The Openness strategy 
subverted the invisible ‘power over’ of the culture of silence and the ‘false 
consciousness’ it engendered in those affected, by creating a space in which newly 
active citizens affected by HIV were able to mobilize, protest, assert their rights and 
challenge the decisions and actions of the DoH and multinational pharmaceuticals.278
This reveals how the TAC relied upon the transformative potential of created spaces 
for the less powerful against power holders. Other TAC strategies such as its 
discussions with NEDLAC sought to open previously closed spaces and subvert 
typical channels of communication, thereby creating new spaces to protest, debate 
and negotiate. 
TAC leaders recognized that ‘agency’ does not work in    lation, and an enabling 
environment in which those affected could organize, campaign, create networks and 
alliances was also vital to the success of the campaign. As a result, TAC campaign 
strategies actively used organizations and informal and formal institutions to inform 
and strengthen its campaign. Ultimately, by engaging with both components of the 
Empowerment Framework, and by being actively aware of     many ways in which 
power can operate, TAC campaigns were able to empower       affected by HIV to 
influence government decisions and access life saving treatment. In this respect, 
those affected by HIV were able to both understand and affect the rules of the game.
Neil Overy (see note 238) at 32.











Chapter 5:  Conclusion: The LEP Approach – Addressing the Limitations
13. Putting power back into the heart of the LEP approach
In a world in which the role of law in development continues to be instrumental in 
furthering the neoliberal objectives of economic growth, LEP can make a potentially 
important contribution to eradicating poverty.  The LEP approach challenges 
conventional discourses on the rule of law by going beyond the confines of the 
purely legal formal system and engaging with both informal and formal institutions, 
and incorporating other development related disciplines. 
The LEP approach objectives are to strengthen the power and capacities of the poor, 
so they may exercise greater control over their lives. In order to achieve this, LEP 
interventions focus less on law, lawyers and state institutions, and more on 
increasing the capacities, opportunities and most fundamentally, power of the poor 
concerning actions and decisions that affect their lives. Indeed, ‘the key concept in 
legal empowerment is not law; it is power.’279
However, as I have argued, Golub’s formulation of the     approach neglects to 
engage critically with, or incorporate a sophisticated understanding of power or 
empowerment, which results in the approach lacking conceptual clarity. Golub, the 
architect of LEP, asserts that LEP interventions prior  ize civil society as the ‘best 
route to strengthening the legal capacities and power    the poor.280’ He understands 
empowerment in individual terms, arguing an increase in power (my 
italics) can have an impact at the institutional level and can impact upon ‘national 
laws and institutions.281’ Furthermore, he argues that ‘where the poor have mor  
power they are better able to make government officials implement the law and 
influential private parties abide by it.282 However, he fails to analyse the power 
of the poor may be strengthened, what form this power takes, civil society is the 
279 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
280 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 3 .
281 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 5 .















best route or indeed the poor are better able to influence government offic  ls or 
influential private parties to implement the law. 
This thesis argues that the LEP paradigm also fails to incorporate a coherent 
framework for either power or empowerment, despite Golub’s claim that power and 
empowerment are central to the LEP approach. A lack of engagement with the 
complexities of power, how empowerment is best achieved, or what each concept 
means within the LEP framework, undermines the commitment to the centrality of 
power to the approach and limits the approach in a number of ways: 
First, a lack of framework results in lawyers and development practitioners being 
unable to analyse in a clear or structured way, the power relations or power interests 
at work within informal or formal institutions. These              represent structural 
systems that are responsible for people becoming and remaining. By corollary, 
without an empowerment or power framework to structure and inform analysis, 
lawyers and development practitioners are unable to analyse how empowerment of 
poor and marginalised people may be best achieved. This lack of framework results 
in the LEP approach being open to a variety of interpretations and operational 
outcomes. The fact that LEP is open to interpretation         the approach 
vulnerable to being co-opted into dominant rule of law approaches to development. 
Dominant approaches emphasize ‘top-down’ strategies which assume that 
‘professional’ external leadership and the imposition    specific, pre-determined 
development models into communities is the most effective way to plan and 
implement development programs. Top- down approaches exclude partnerships with 
the poor, and the emphasis is on law and not on power. The fact that the LEP 
approach is not conceptually clear about what it means by power and empowerment 
and how these could be operationalised, means that the LEP approach risks being 
operationally irrelevant. The 2008 CLEP283 report illustrates that the LEP approach is 
open to broad interpretation and therefore how LEP interventions risk placing too 
much emphasis on either individuals or institutions respectively. The report focuses 
upon legal interventions and advocates the notion of material improvement as the 
central means to development, in accordance with traditional rule of law approaches 
to development. Dan Banik’s assertion that ‘the CLEP’s recommendations remain
283 Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008 Report.
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very top-down, state-centred and orthodox in nature’ further highlights the report’s 
alignment with the dominant rule of law approach.  
A second implication of the LEP approach’s failure to incorporate a framework for 
power and empowerment is the tendency for LEP interventions to over-emphasize 
institutions or individual agency respectively. Golub        that the formal 
institutions and organisations traditionally supported by the ROL approach operate to 
benefit elites rather than the poor.284 However, I argue that the LEP approach places 
too much attention upon interventions that seek to strengthen individual agency and 
too little focus on harnessing or challenging the way    which power operates in 
organizations and formal institutions. I introduce the Holland and Brooks 
Empowerment Model to demonstrate that empowerment is dependent on the 
interplay between both individual agency and institutions comprising opportunity 
structure. Agency is the ability to choose, and to make meaningful, informed choices 
about one’s life. Opportunity structure is the context within which people operate, 
which is shaped to an extent by informal and formal institutions (traditionally the 
focus of the ROL approach). These institutions have the potential to assist or 
constrain the ability to transform agency into effective action, and as a result, I argue 
that in order to realise the full effects of strengthened agency, whereby individuals 
are able to make meaningful choices about their lives, LEP interventions must take 
into account the informal and formal institutions comprising opportunity structure. 
The LEP approach’s lack of conceptual clarity also increases the potential for 
important concepts such as the ‘rules of the game,’ that define and distinguish the 
LEP, approach to be undermined.  I propose Gaventa’s Power Framework    work in 
conjunction with the Empowerment Model to enable a deeper understanding of how, 
at the agency and opportunity structure components of  he Empowerment Model, the 
various forms and levels of power exist and operate in tension with one another. I 
argue that Gaventa’s Power Framework also provides a t    to understand how the 
notion of ‘space’ can be used to challenge or influence the ways in which power is 
exerted by organizations, and formal and informal institutions. In this respect, 
Gaventa’s Power Framework facilitates a better understanding of how the ‘rules of 
284 Golub (see note 5) at 27.











the game’ operate, and how they can be affected, which is something I argue the LEP 
approach neglects to do.
I use the Empowerment Model and Power Framework to show how the TAC’s 
success is due in part to its recognition of the many     s that power takes, and the 
many ways in which it may operate. I show how the TAC        to strengthen the 
agency of people affected by HIV, by building upon individual assets and engaging 
inter-related forms of power as well as harnessing the power wielded by formal and 
informal institutions comprising opportunity structure. I argue that by being actively 
aware of the many ways in which power can operate, TAC campaigns were able to 
empower those affected by HIV to influence government           and access life 
saving treatment for those affected by HIV in South Africa. 
Finally, this thesis acknowledges that the ROL approach prioritises economic 
objectives, presents poverty as something that can be objectively and scientifically 
measured and frames development in terms that are presented as technical and 
apolitical. However, I argue that by neglecting the formal institutions and 
organizations that the ROL approach supports, the LEP approach fails to address the 
structural systems that are responsible for people becoming and remaining poor and 
as a result, risks being another disengaged model that reinforces the ‘limitations’285
and ‘structure blindness’286 of the ROL approach. Singular focus on building the 
agency of poor and marginalized people ignores the structural systems that are 
responsible for people remaining poor. Such a focus risks depoliticizing poverty and 
maintaining a status quo that reflects elite power and interests. Indeed, as the 
Empowerment Model and Power Framework demonstrate, powerlessness does not 
occur in a vacuum but within existing political and social structures. I argue that the 
LEP approach must incorporate a framework for power and empowerment in order 
to mark a genuine departure from the limitations of the ROL approach and fulfil the 
approach’s significant potential to facilitate empowerment.  
285 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 7 .
286 Stephen Golub (see note 5) at 3 .












Airaksinen Timo, The Rhetoric of Domination (1992) Rethinking Power: Thomas E Wartenberg (ed) 
State University of New York Press
Alsop Ruth and Norton Andrew, Power, Rights and Povert   eduction (2004)
Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections, World Bank Publications, Ruth Alsop (Ed)
Banik Dan, Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty Eradication (2009)
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1: T.M.C. Asser Press 
Banik Dan ‘Introduction’ Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty (2009)
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1: T.M.C. Asser Press 
Brock, Cornwall, Gaventa, Power Knowledge and political spaces in the framing of poverty policy 
(2001) Institute of Development Studies Working paper 143
Brother Mona Elisabeth, Legal Empowerment as a New Concept in Development: Translating Good 
ideas into Action (2008) Banik Dan, Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating        , Ashgate 
Publishing Group.
Carothers Thomas, ‘Power and Empowerment’ available at 
CESR Human Rights insights no.1 (2010) at 
Chimni Bhupinder, The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary International Law 
Discourse: Some Parallels (2008) The Law and Development Review, Vol 1, No 1
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor Volume I
Making the Law Work for Everyone 
(
Cornwall Andrea and Nyamu-Musembi Celestine, Putting the ‘rights-based approach’ to development 
into perspective (2004), Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No.8. 
Cornwall Andrea, Making spaces, changing places: situating participation in development (2002), 
Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 170 
Cornwall Andrea and Brock Karen, Beyond Buzzwords “Poverty Reduction”, “Participation” and 
“Empowerment” in Development Policy (2005), United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development Overarching Concerns Programme Paper 10
Csaszar Fruzsina, Understanding the Concept of Power (2004)
Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections,          k Publications, Ruth Alsop (ed)
Department for International Development, ‘Realining Human Rights for Poor People’ Strategies for 
achieving the International Development Targets, (2000) DFID paper with assistance from Rosalind 
Eyben and Clare Ferguson
Du Toit Andries, Poverty measurement blues: Some reflections on the space for understanding ‘chronic’ 
and ‘structural’ poverty in South Africa (2005) CPRC Working Paper 55 PLAAS Chronic Poverty and 
Development Policy Series No. 6
Friedman S and Mottiar S, Seeking the High Ground: The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics 

















Economic and Social Development Department, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations – The impact of HIV/AIDS on rural households and land issues in Southern and Eastern Africa  
( )
Faundez Julio, ‘Empowering Workers in the Informal Economy (2009) 
Hague Journal of Law Vol 1 No.l 
Friedman Steven and Mottiar Shauna, A Rewarding Engagement? The Treatment Action Campaign and 
the Politics of HIV/AIDS 
(
)
Gaventa John, Reflections on the Uses of the “Power Cube” Approach for Analyzing the Spaces, Places 
and Dynamics of Civil Society Participation and Engagement, CFP evaluation series 2003- 2006, no 4 
Golub Stephen, Beyond rule of law orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative (2003) 
Working Paper Rule of Law Series No 41 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Golub Stephen, One Big Step Forward and A Few Steps Ba          elopment Policy and Practice’ 
(2009) Hague Journal on the Rule of law , Vol 1, No 1
Heywood Mark, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilzation to 
Realise the Right to Health (2009) Journal of Human Rights Practice Vol 1, No 1
Heywood Mark, Civil Society and Uncivil Government, The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) versus 
Thabo Mbeki 1998-2008 (2010) Mbeki and After, Reflections on the Legacy     habo Mbeki, Ed D 
Glaser, Wits University Press
High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor at 4 
(Cadastre & Land Registry  Norwegian Mapping and Cadastre Authority). 
Jacobs Sean and Johnson Krista, Media, Social Movements and the State: Competing Images of 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa (2007), African Studies Quarterly, Vol 9, Issue 4
Kabeer Naila, Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment (2002) 
Discussing Women’s Empowerment: Theory and Practice, Sida Studies.
Kapczynski Amy and Berger Jonathan M, The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of 
Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa (
)
Kelly M.J and Cohen Desmond D, The impacts of HIV/AIDS on development  
( )
Kennedy David, Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance (2008) available at 
Kennedy David, The “Rule of Law” Political choices and Development Common Sense (2006)
The New Law and Economic Development, A Critical Appraisal
David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (Eds)
Cambridge University Press 
Khair Sumaiya, Evaluating Legal Empowerment: Problems of Analysis and Measurement (2009)
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law Vol 1, No 1
Krygier Martin, The Rule of Law and The Three Integrations (2009)





















Misturelli Federica and Heffernan Claire, What is Poverty? A diachronic exploration of the discourse on 
poverty from the 1970s to the 2000s (2008) The European Journal of Development Research Vol 20 
No.4 Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group pp. 666-684(19)
Mosedale Sarah, Assessing women's empowerment: towards a conceptual framework (2005) 
Journal of International Development J. Int. Dev. 17, Published online in Wiley InterScience 
(www.interscience.wiley.com). 
Moser Caroline, Rights Power and Poverty reduction (2004)
Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections, World Bank Publication, Ruth Alsop (Ed)
Moser Caroline,
Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs (1989) 
World Development vol 17 No 11 
Mosse David, Power Relations and Poverty Reduction (2004) 
Power, Rights, and Poverty: Concepts and Connections,          k Publications, Ruth Alsop (ed)
Mustakova- Possardt Elena, Is there a roadmap to critical consiousness? Available at 
http://www.onecountry.org/e152/e15216as_Review_Consciousness_story.htm
Nattrass, Mortal Combat: AIDS Denialism and the Struggle for Anti-retrovirals in South Africa (2007) 
Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaSulu-Natal Press
Nattrass C.C, Affadiavit 
( )
North Douglass C, (1990)
Cambridge University Press
Otto Jan Michiel, Rule of Law Promotion, Land Tenure and Poverty Alleviation: Questioning the 
Assumptions of Hernando de Soto (2009) Hague Journal of Law, Vol 1, No 1 
Overy Neil, In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights Government Inertia with 
Budget Advocacy and Litigation (2011) International Budget Partnership, Study No. 7 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol 20, No 1 
(http://www.relooney.info/00_New_951.pdf)
Powercube: Understanding power for social change, Institute of Development Studies
(http://ids.ac.uk/go/idsproject/powercube-understanding-power-for-social-change)
Robins Steven, Khululeka – From Social Movement to Men’s Support Group, A Case Study of Aids 
Activism in Guguletu, Cape Town, Participatory Governance? Citizens and the State in South Africa 
(2007) African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy Lisa Thompson (ed)
Robins Steven, Long Live Zackie, Long Live, AIDS Activism, Science and Citizenship after Apartheid
( )
Santos Alvaro, The World Bank’s uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development (2006) 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12
Sano Hans-Otto, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary but Partial Integration of Human 
Rights and Development (2000) Human Rights Quarterly 
Sen Amartya 
Development as Freedom (2000) 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf
Sengupta Arjun, The Political Economy of Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008)
www.tac.org.za/documents/MTCTCourtCase/ccmnnatt.rtf












Banik Dan, Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty
Skoog Gun Eriksson, Supporting the Development of Institutions – formal and informal rules: An 
evaluation Theme, Basic concepts (2005)
UTV Working Paper, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(
)
Stephens Matthew, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed 
(2009) Hague Journal on the Rule of law Vol 1, No 1
(http://journals.cambridge.org)
Stiglitz Joseph E, Capital Market Liberalization, Globalization and the IMF (2004) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol 20, No 1
Trubek David M, The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New D        ntal 
State (2008), Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Vol 1, No 1
Trubek David and Santos Alvaro, The Third moment in Law and Development Theory and the 
emergence of a new critical practice (2006) The New Law and Economic Development
Cambridge University Press 
UNDP, Human Development Report  (1990)
VeneKlasen Lisa and Miller Valerie, A New Weave of Power, People & Politics: The Action Guide of 
Advocacy and Citizen Participation ( )
Willman Bordat Stephanie and Kouzzi Saida, Legal Empowerment of unwed Mothers: Experiences of 
Moroccan NGOs 
Legal Empowerment Practitioners’ Perspectives International Development Law Organisation, Legal and 
Governance Reform, Lessons Learned, No.2/2010 Stephen Golub (ed)
Wojkowska Eva, Doing Justice, How informal systems can contribute (2006) 
UNDP Oslo Governance Centre 
(
)
World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform: Observations, Experiences, and Approach of the Legal Vice 
Presidency (2002) Washington D.C: World Bank 
(http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/ljrobservations-final.pdf)
World Health Organization Structural Adjustment Programmes, Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and 
health (http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html)
http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/pdf/sv/Supporting-the-Development-of-Institutions---Formal-
and-Informal-Rules-An-Evaluation-Theme-Basic-Concepts.pdf
http://www.justassociates.org/tableofcontents.pdf
http://www.democraciaejustica.org/cienciapolitica3/sites/default/files/doingjusticeewawojkowska13030
7.pdf
